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Abstract 
Because my brother was born with cerebral palsy, I became interested in why the 
general, nondisabled public inaccurately presumes his abilities, or disabilities. This thesis 
proves that the cultural representation of people with disabilities results from a pejorative 
disabled lexicon. These disability discourses circulate a disability logos; one where a 
person with a disability is helpless, born into unfair circumstances, and therefore unable 
to live a happy life.  
            This misunderstanding of a person with a disability is incongruent with disability 
government policy, which has created laws pushing for the incorporation of people with 
disabilities into public society. Such policies, like the American with Disabilities Act, the 
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, and The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 
mandate the inclusion of people with disabilities into the workplace, public buildings, and 
schools. These acts thereby remove the descriptor of “helpless” by allowing individuals 
with disabilities the possibility of independence within these public spaces.  
My thesis was born out of this perplexing dilemma; why cultural interpretations 
of disabilities fails to include these individuals into majority society as opposed to 
government policies. It is a quizzical investigation into this still prominent disability 
logos. I examine reasons for its existence, the history of such, and why this logos remains 
embedded in the cultural representation of disabilities today. This thesis argues that the 
language used to discuss people with disabilities, and metaphors incorporating 
disabilities, must be changed to advance cultural representations of a person with a 
disability because of language’s portrayal of cultural truths.  
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1. Introduction 
 “Wow, your brother is so tall,” people often say to me when 
they see this picture of my sister (Lauren), my brother (Sam), and myself. At about 5’4,” 
Sam is not short, however, Sam is not standing in this picture, either. In fact, Sam is 
sitting in his wheel chair while my sister and I are kneeling beside him. The person 
commenting on his extraordinary height does not know this, though, and I am always 
unsure of how to respond. Do I inform them of the real reason (his wheel chair) that he 
looks so tall? Am I lying, or hiding something, if I do not? Is letting the person 
believe that Sam is standing a misrepresentation of the truth, and does that dismiss an 
integral part of Sam’s personhood? And most importantly – why do I feel guilty not 
sharing this fact, and yet feel like I am oversharing if I do?   
My brother is fifteen months older than my sister and I, and often when peers find 
out I have an older brother they become curious. And again I struggle with what to 
reveal; how to describe my brother and define our relationship. At twenty-two years of 
age, I am still unsure of how to formulate my response. Many times I have tried, while 
looking at this picture, to see an incredibly tall, standing man. It is impossible for me. I 
only see his body awkwardly protruding out of his wheelchair – a position his body 
assumes whenever he is excited – because I have only ever known Sam sitting; I have 
never seen him stand independently.  
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When I do choose to tell people, “I guess I could see how you would think that, 
but actually, he is sitting in his wheelchair and we are kneeling,” a familiar exchange 
begins, in which I attempt to convey the Sam I know: my brother . . . who happens to 
have cerebral palsy, but not my “disabled” brother. I must now choose my words and 
tonality very carefully, as I attempt to avoid those looks of understanding and 
sympathy that often proceed this declaration. Not only do I resent this reaction, but I 
do not need it. This is, and has always been, my reality: a brother who happens to be 
different from most other people’s siblings, and a member of a population that many 
people in our society have a very limited understanding of, and minimal interaction with. 
     Sam was born three months premature and was diagnosed with cerebral palsy 
(CP) shortly after. In layman’s terms, CP is a stroke at birth and has highly varied effects 
on the body and brain. An individual with CP can be anywhere from extremely high 
to extremely low functioning, and it can affect nearly any of an individual’s abilities. 
Sam’s CP falls somewhere in the middle: physically, his torso is extremely weak, making 
it difficult for him to stand. His muscles are weak as well, and by the age of seven his 
body had become too heavy for him to continue walking with a walker. Becoming 
increasingly more reliant on a wheelchair, Sam eventually put aside the walker for good. 
Today he uses a power chair and has a 24-hour live-in aid to help him with everyday 
tasks, such as hygiene, making food, getting dressed, and getting in and out of his bed, 
wheel/power chair, the car, etc. Mentally, Sam has a nearly photographic memory, 
rambles on about any philosophical and/or religious topic available to him, and writes 
exceptional prose. Because of his CP, though, his brain runs slower than the typical brain, 
and subsequently becomes overwhelmed faster. This mental diagnosis led to Sam’s 
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placement in special education classes in high school, and is the reason why he 
chooses to take only two classes a semester at Santa Monica Community College. 
            A few years ago, Sam was feeling ill and called my dad for a ride home from a 
crowded street in downtown Santa Monica, Los Angeles, where he currently resides. 
Because my dad could not fit Sam’s power chair in his car, he drove Sam’s power chair 
home and Sam’s aid drove the two of them home in my dad’s car. This is how my dad 
described his afternoon to me: 
“I got into Sam's chair and began ‘driving’ it at slow speed down Third 
Street. What was so remarkable, and the reason I remember this so 
vividly, is what I saw while in that chair. Every single person who I passed 
did one of two things. Either they avoided eye contact with me entirely, or, 
if they made eye contact, the look on their face was one of incredible 
sadness, as if to say, ‘you poor thing.’  No one smiled.  No one made what 
I would call ‘regular’ everyday eye contact with strangers, that matter-of-
fact look that has no intent or meaning behind it.” (J. Hersch) 
Sam’s weak torso causes him to dramatically lean to the left when he sits in his 
chair, as opposed to an individual with paralysis who might have the upper 
body strength to sit straight. His physical appearance makes it clear to the public that he 
is developmentally disabled, not paralyzed. A developmental disability is defined by the 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention as “a group of conditions due to an 
impairment in physical, learning, language, or behavior areas,” and the most common 
developmental disabilities (DD) are Down Syndrome, Cerebral Palsy, and Fetal Alcohol 
Syndrome; DDs tend to be outwardly identifiable, like Sam’s CP. That said, my dad is a 
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physically strong fifty-five year old man who presumably sat up straight when driving 
Sam’s power chair, displaying no signs of any other physical and/or mental impairment 
aside from his placement in the power chair. And yet, he “found the experience so 
disturbing that at the next corner [he] turned off Third and went onto a side street which 
was empty.” 
When I asked Sam to describe to me his everyday interactions with the 
public, he said nothing that echoed my dad’s experience. In fact, Sam said he noticed 
no adverse reactions from the public when he power chaired down the street. In 
conclusion, my dad said to me, “What is amazing to me is that this must be Sam's 
everyday experience. He never talks about it, but how can it be otherwise?” Sam, though, 
explicitly states the opposite. Call me naïve, but I do not believe my dad 
experienced an animosity that Sam does not. However, this has always been Sam’s 
experience; he has never known another relationship with the public, and so he is 
ignorant of this treatment. 
There is something about this power chair, the clear presence of a disability, 
which automatically necessitates a sympathetic response. I hesitate to vocalize Sam’s 
disability because of this misunderstood cultural understanding of a person with a 
disability. I can personally attest to Sam’s internalization of this treatment, and the 
negative impact it has had on his self-esteem. My interest in the originations, and reason 
for stagnation, of this detrimental cultural interpretation of a person with a physically 
apparent disability has stemmed out of Sam’s everyday experiences, and internalizations 
of them.  
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A fourteen year-old girl I work with has a low-functioning disability that has 
severely impacted both her mental and physical abilities; she is non-verbal and cannot 
walk independently. When I was describing her to my friend, he asked me, “what is the 
quality of life for someone like that” (Stolier). A similar interaction took place with 
another friend, when she said to me, “I would abort a child with down syndrome because 
I would never want them to have to live such a terrible life” (Cambell). I cannot speak for 
individuals with disabilities, and therefore cannot attest to their quality of life. However, 
what these conversations show is the general cultural understanding that a person with a 
disability does not have a high quality of life. But just because they do not have certain 
abilities a typical person has, does not mean their life is inherently worse. Because of this 
mode of thought, though, people with disabilities, like Sam, are generally exempt from 
societal rules, which leads to their marginalization from majority, nondisabled society. 
As this thesis attempts to prove, this cultural representation results from a 
pejorative disabled lexicon. These disability discourses circulate a disability logos; one 
where a person with a disability is helpless, born into unfair circumstances, and therefore 
unable to live a happy life.  
            This misunderstanding of a person with a disability is incongruent with disability 
government policy, which has created many laws pushing for the incorporation of people 
with disabilities into public society. Such policies, like the American with Disabilities 
Act, the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, and The Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, mandate the inclusion of people with disabilities into the workplace, 
public buildings, and schools. These acts thereby remove the descriptor of “helpless” by 
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allowing individuals with disabilities the possibility of independence within these public 
spaces.  
My thesis was born out of this perplexing dilemma; why cultural interpretations 
of disabilities fail to include these individuals into majority society as opposed to 
government policies. It is a quizzical investigation into this still prominent disability 
logos. I examine reasons for its existence, the history of such, and why this logos remains 
embedded in the cultural representation of disabilities today.  
2. Disability Language and Reality 
Anthropologist-linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, authors of the 
“Whorf-Sapir Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis,” argue that “the structure and lexicon of 
one’s language influences how one perceives and conceptualizes the world, and they do 
so in a systemic way” (Swoyer). I apply this idea to the perception of people with 
disabilities, arguing that our contemporary cultural understanding of, and meanings of, 
disability reflects and results from the metaphors, images, and literal words used to 
describe disability.  
According to Whorf and Sapir, language and identity are inextricably linked. In 
“The Status of Linguistics as Science,” Sapir writes, “Human beings do not live in the 
objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, 
but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium 
of expression for their society” (209). As stated within this quote, human interaction does 
not dictate language, but rather language influences human interaction. When a being 
arrives into this world, s/he is already part of a verbal community, and becomes subject to 
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predetermined ideals of what it means to be “human.” This applies directly to people with 
what are called “disabilities.”  
As Sapir writes, “Even comparatively simple acts of perception are very much 
more at the mercy of the social patterns called words than we might suppose…We see 
and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of 
our community predispose certain choices of interpretation” (210). Interpretations of the 
possible cultural meanings of disability are shaped by the language (and image) 
associated with disability. The word “disabled,” therefore, determines social reactions to 
disabilities, and subsequently affects the reality of a person with a disability. 
The term “language” designates all forms of interaction, including written word, 
speech, peer relationships, and policy. As Michael Oliver writes in “Politics and 
Language: Understanding the Disability Discourse,” “It is often assumed that the function 
of language is communication. While it is undoubtedly true that communication is a 
function of language, it is not the only one. Language is also about politics, domination 
and control.” As Oliver states, communication unarguably remains language’s most 
pertinent function, while also structuring social hierarchies. Examining a society’s 
lexicon exposes the power struggles, the identities, and the leaders, among other 
ideologies, too, of that culture. Magnifying and dissecting disability discourses in 
contemporary American society, as well as its history, thereby provides a method for 
determining the hierarchical placement of a person with a disability in society.  
According to twentieth century linguistic theorist Ferdinand de Saussure, a word 
or sign consists of two terms: the sound-image and the concept, or signifier and signified. 
The sound-image refers to the imprint the word heard leaves on the brain, and the concept 
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results from the individual’s interpretation of that sound-image. The sound-image and the 
concept forever unite to form the sign, but the relationship between the two is arbitrary. 
For example, although different languages have a different word(s) for the concept of a 
plate, the individual, upon hearing the accepted word(s) within their language for a 
“plate,” interprets this sound-image as the concept of a “plate.” This arbitrary relationship 
permits an individual to arrive at any concept from any sound-image, or many concepts 
(and vice-versa), allowing individual words the possibility of multiple meanings.  
When applying this structure of signifier and signified to the sign “disabled,” 
circulating cultural ideas about disabilities materialize into cultural representations of 
disabilities, which morph into accepted truths. Culture’s signs help determine how and 
what people in this culture can name and can think about – the language, or signs, of 
disability therefore become “reality.”  
Strictly defined, “disabled” means “less-than-able,” and whom society has 
designated as “the disabled” demonstrates Saussure’s linguistic structure. The translation 
of “dis” and “able” in current language results from term’s intra-dependent relationship 
within the entirety of language. Saussure labels this effect the “value” of the sign. 
Because current language contains the sign “able,” defined as “having the power, skill, 
money, etc., that is needed to do something,” and “dis,” meaning “not,” the sign 
“disabled” comes to signify thoughts congruent with “not ‘having the power, skill, 
money, etc., that is needed to do some/(any)thing’” (Merriam-Webster). A person 
displaying characteristics consistent with an explicit inability therefore becomes 
associated with these meanings that emerge from the term “disabled.”  
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Cultural Construction of a “Disabled” Person 
Aimee Mullins, a disability activist and double-leg amputee, summarizes the 
broader contextualization of the word “disabled” within our society. Mullins says “I 
looked up the word disabled to see what I’d find, let me read you the entry. Disabled, adj, 
crippled, helpless, useless, wrecked, wounded, mangled, lame . . . weakened . . 
castrated . . . done for . . . see also, hurt, useless, weak. Antonyms, healthy strong 
capable” (0:38). Mullins’ exposé of the definition for “disabled” articulates the still 
current understanding, as verified by the dictionary, that a disability is a negative aspect 
of someone's identity. Within this definition emerges the logos of a disability within our 
culture; a person with a disability is “helpless, useless, weak . . .”  
Furthermore, “dis” provides its own historic reference to negative connotations, 
reaching as far back as BCE and continuing into the fourteenth century. In Roman 
mythology, “Dis” is the alternative name for the Greek Hades, appearing first in Virgil’s 
Aeneid, and later in Dante’s Inferno, where “Dis” claims the title of both the lower levels 
of hell (8-9) and Lucifer’s name (Harpur 330). The word “disability,” therefore, not only 
translates into variants of the notion “less than able,” but also contains malicious 
undertones. In “From disability to ability: changing the phrasing of the debate,” disability 
theorist Paul Harpur writes, “Rather than just representing the opposite of something, the 
word ‘dis’ arguably represents something stronger such as undesirable or perhaps even 
something evil” (330). The thesaurus’ list of synonyms for “disabled” shows the 
multiplicity of signifieds associated with this signifier, all of which encompass the history 
of “dis” because of their adverse implications. Disability is thus defined as encompassing 
every ideal not present within the word “able,” and dissociated from positive ideals.  
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Paul Longmore, a founding father of the disability rights movement and the late 
director of the Institute on Disability at San Francisco State University, clarifies the 
cultural definition of the disability logos, saying, “those views of what disability is point 
to the fact that disability is not simply metaphysical and physiological, it’s much more 
importantly, it’s social and cultural, it’s a constructed identity . . . the stigma is globalized 
to engulf their entire identities” (Hoffman 02:18).  As Longmore explains, society has 
manufactured this shame associated with being disabled, which then becomes 
incorporated within the cultural interpretations of “disability” and the identity of a person 
with a disability.  
Elaborating on possibly more signifiers, Longmore writes that what “‘Americans 
individually and collectively fear most" is "limitation and dependence, failure and 
incapacity, loss of control, loss of autonomy, at its deepest level, confinement within the 
human condition, [and] subjection to fate,’” ideas which are loudly spoken through the 
disabled body (qtd. Wilson 174). As the antonym to “able,” “disable” also signifies what 
Longmore determines scares Americans – that physical representation of a reliance on 
others, and an inability to escape this dependence; the disabled body epitomizes the 
antithesis of the idealized American. The dreaded helplessness present at the site of the 
disabled body metamorphoses into social reactions to these individuals, culminating in 
Longmore’s description of “fear.” As Longmore argues, a disability becomes disabling 
more through its confinement and representation of this cumulative fear, than from the 
physical effects the specific disability has on the individual. 
Furthermore, disabilities are not restricted to the poor or the sick, the dirty or the 
clean; anyone, at any time, can become disabled, transforming a once independent figure 
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into one reliant on another. This dependence also severely contradicts the notion of 
independence interwoven within the idealized American, heightening the dread 
Longmore expresses above. They represent to the non-disabled American public what 
they fear they could become - dependent, “needy,” disabled.  
The binary able/disable dictates this separation between two distinguishable 
groups: those who can, and those who cannot. An “able-bodied” individual can therefore 
distance themselves from the identity of “disabled” people, asserting independence as 
desirable as Americaness, which is self-proved by their ability to “help.” As Mary 
Klages, in her book “Woeful Afflictions: Disability and Sentimentality in Victorian 
America,” writes, “within the domestic sphere that creates the empathic self, humans are 
recognized as fundamentally embodied, but the significance of those bodies is inscribed 
through their ability to feel for and act on behalf of the weak or dependent or suffering, 
rather than through their genitalia, skin color, sensory apparatus, or capacity for 
rationality” (6). As Klages articulates, human empathy is derived from our capacity to 
help others, as determined by apparent strength, and therefore supposed ability, 
personified through our physical body. Words like “helpless, useless . . . weakened” 
create an image of disability as dependence, rather than independence – this enables non-
disabled persons to display their humanity by helping the helpless to enhance their 
“empathic self” (Mullins; Klages 6). Widening this division between the two groups is 
the fact that “empathic subjectivity is defined as a fundamentally embodied and also 
universal form of self, one that considers bodies similar on the basis of their capacity to 
feel and express emotions. The body is framed as a site not of sexuality, productive labor 
or rationality, but of feeling for others and acting to help others" (Klages 6). That said, 
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those who have bodies described as “able” can (and have the moral duty to) “help” those 
who have bodies signifying a supposed need for this help.  
In “‘Saying The ‘F Word … In The Nicest Possible Way’: Augmentative 
Communication And Discourses Of Disability," Tom Shakespeare elaborates on the 
distinction, claiming “disabled people are an oppressed group, stereotyped as ‘other’ in a 
number of ways, such as by being seen as dependent, vulnerable and unable to make their 
own decisions or speak up for themselves” (qtd. Brewester 128). As Shakespeare 
underlines, this contrast between abled and disabled people enacts an “us” and “them” 
nomenclature that translates into a majority/minority social and political structure.  
This belittlement of people with disabilities formed in the mid eighteenth century, 
where, in an attempt to integrate people with disabilities into larger society, these 
signifiers became conflated with the disabled lexicon. Klages describes the origins of the 
disabled logos, writing: 
"By mid-[eighteenth] century, the scientization and professionalization of 
institutional care for the disabled began to produce images of disabled 
people as defective, as failed humans, and thus as a class distinct from, 
and inferior to, nondisabled people; these depictions marked a separation 
between the professional and the popular cultural sentimental views of 
disabled people, which continued to portray them as ‘afflicted.’” (4)  
Today, particular medical and scientific interpretations of people with disabilities have 
significantly advanced. For example, they are no longer viewed as “defective” and “failed 
humans” who should be sterilized, placed in insane asylums, and, in severe cases, not 
continue to live (“Disability Rights;” Carter-Long 01:50). However, the formation of an 
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"inferior" group, and the "popular cultural sentimental views . . . [portraying] them as 
'afflicted,'" currently thrives, determining the treatment and representation of people with 
disabilities in society (Woeful Afflictions 4).  
Continuing to articulate the history of this cultural view of people with disabilities 
as "afflicted," Klages writes: 
“Since the first efforts to integrate disabled people into mainstream culture 
in the late eighteenth century, disabled people have existed largely as 
‘poster children.’ They have served as silent spectacles, images to be 
viewed by the non-disabled, whose importance has been in their ability to 
appear pathetic and to produce a sympathetic or sentimental response in 
nondisabled people. They have, as a result, been relegated to the status of 
permanent children, defined by their perceived dependence on the 
nondisabled. Like children, they are assumed to need protection, whether 
in the form of individual guardianship or of special laws governing their 
educational and economic existence.” (2) 
Our contemporary interpretation of people with disabilities today echoes this eighteenth 
century interpretation, emphasizing the present need for further improvement in the 
cultural representation of disabilities.  
Throughout the last century, disability politics has attempted to deconstruct 
able/disable with new laws and programs encouraging the incorporation of people with 
disabilities into mainstream American society.1 Yet the social meanings of the culturally 
                                                        
1 Laws and Programs are detailed in the next section. 
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available signifiers of disability remain congruent with images established some two 
hundred years ago in American culture.  
3. Repression of Presidential Disability 
The number of disabled citizens in the United States rapidly increased during the 
first half of the twentieth century. After World War One, the number of wounded and 
disabled veterans was about 204,000 (“Veterans: World War 1”). The first great polio 
outbreak of 1916 led to “more than 27,000 cases,” and in the second great outbreak of 
1952, “nearly 60,000 children were infected with the virus; thousands were paralyzed” 
("Wiping Out Polio”). Today there are about three and half million disabled veterans 
living in this country, and the programs that exist to address the needs of these veterans 
are in part a reaction to the boom in the disabled population seen in early the 1900’s 
("Newsroom"). This century also elected America’s first and only president with a 
significant physical disability, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. But even amidst the 
rise in the disabled population and new disability policies, President Roosevelt 
consciously hid his disability from the public; a testament to society’s reluctance to 
accept people with disabilities into the mainstream, and particularly as the leader of the 
Free World (Davis 23). 
When Roosevelt contracted polio in 1921, he was already a public political figure, 
having conquered the title of New York Senator, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and a 
vice-presidential candidate in the 1920 presidential elections (Kiewe 89; Stein 38). Intent 
on continuing his political career in spite of his polio, the need for masking his altered 
physical state was understood as a necessity if he hoped to become president. Davis W. 
Houck in “Reading the body in the text: FDR’s 1932 speech to the democratic national 
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convention,” affirms this concern, writing, “Roosevelt’s political enemies claimed that 
his crippled body automatically disqualified him from presidential duties” (20). Here 
Houck also provides a glimpse into public perception of the disabling aspects of a 
physical disability at this time.  
Roosevelt’s seemingly ludicrous hopes for political success expressed the 
disproportionate emphasis the public placed on physical strength as a signifier of mental 
capabilities. Margaret “Daisy” Suckley, Roosevelt’s closest friend by the end of his life, 
wrote in her diary on August 7, 1933, “‘the President is a MAN - mentally, physically & 
spiritually - What more can I say’” (qtd. Houck 20). In response, Houck writes, “why 
would Roosevelt be seen as anything other than a ‘MAN’” (20). This literary interaction 
incorporates ideals of manhood into the entangled relationship between body and mind, 
and as Houck specifies, “polio raised an additional issue – that of Roosevelt’s 
masculinity” (22).  
This (assumedly irrelevant) connection between polio and masculinity emerges 
from “the body politic,” a sociological theory Moira Gatens argues is “‘a creation of men 
for men’” (qtd. Houck 22). As Houck explains, the president resides at the top of the 
body politic, and the individual seeking this role “‘should satisfy our expectations of 
‘masculinity’” (qtd. Houck 22). “Masculinity” is admittedly a cultural construct, 
however, as R.W. Connelly states, “‘true masculinity . . . is almost always thought to 
proceed from men’s bodies’” (qtd. Houck 22). That said, a physically altering disability 
contests this ideal manhood and therefore impedes the individual’s quest for ultimate 
political success. As Houck writes, “The correlation, then, between masculinity and the 
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male body is ruptured precisely at the point of physical incapacity,” identifiable within 
Roosevelt’s reliance on a wheelchair (22).  
According to Houck, “the masculine ideal” of the 1920’s “was to possess not only 
physical strength, but also to exercise mastery over one’s physical body” (23). In order to 
accomplish this bodily sovereignty, Roosevelt would have to prove to the public he had 
defeated polio’s adverse physical effects, because, “within the socio-historical context of 
masculinity and politics,” his polio rendered him “not ‘man enough’ to govern” (23). 
Critical, then, to Roosevelt’s political aspiration was the ability to appear physically 
strong and independent. Fortunately for Roosevelt, media had yet to advance past the 
stage of newspapers and radios, making the concealment of Roosevelt’s physical 
weakness relatively easier in comparison to today’s increasingly all-seeing visual-media-
centered culture.   
In acknowledgement of the body politic narrative, both Roosevelt and his political 
team structured his campaign around proving his physical abilities to the public. Houck 
writes, “Roosevelt’s disguise . . . was born of both personal insecurity and political 
necessity. To entertain any hopes of the presidency after his 1921 infection, Roosevelt 
believed that he had to show himself to the voting public as physically fit, in a word, he 
had to walk” (20). This strategy was applied merely two days after Roosevelt’s polio 
diagnosis, when The New York Times reported that Roosevelt “‘caught a heavy cold and 
was threatened with pneumonia' and was 'recovering slowly' (August 27, 1921)" (qtd. 
Houck 23). Once the thin disguise of a cold wore off, his doctor, George Draper, 
reassured the public that Roosevelt would regain his stride, publicly stating “‘you can say 
definitely that he will not be crippled. No one need have any fear of permanent injury 
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from this attack’” (qtd. Houck 23). This was the first of numerous press releases detailing 
Roosevelt’s falsified recovery. The extent of FDR’s role in this public deceit, however, 
remains unclear today. Regardless of who initiated this first exaggerated statement, the 
language-based media of newspapers and radio proceeded to portray Roosevelt as the 
man Draper here depicts for the remainder of his political career. Draper also directly 
addresses the fear “the disability” created in the early 20th century American ideal of 
individualism and self-reliance.2  
Government policy after WW1 had little empathy for people with disabilities 
despite the increase in the disabled population. A 1924 Virginia law “allowed[ed] for 
sterilization without consent of the ‘feeble minded, insane, depressed, mentally 
handicapped, epileptic’” etc., showing the effort to prevent the “spread” of inherited 
disabilities (“Disability Rights”). The U.S. Supreme Court further supported this view 
when they “upheld the law in its 1927 Buck v. Bell decision,” leading to the beginnings 
of sterilization programs in twenty-seven other states (“Disability Rights”).  
Daniel J Wilson, in “Braces, Wheelchairs, and Iron Lungs: the paralyzed body 
and the machinery of rehabilitation in the polio epidemics,” confirms that social dogma 
of the time would have supported this treatment of people with disabilities. Wilson 
writes, “While growing up in the thirties and forties,” there was “‘a general, perhaps 
unconsciously felt, fear of the disabled. This was not so much a fear of them but a fear of 
what they symbolized—human vulnerability to disease, disability, and death’” (176). 
Wilson here re-iterates Longmore’s earlier mentioned fear of people with disabilities.  
Apparent within this echo is the parallel between current cultural interpretations of 
                                                        
2 Re-iterating Longmore’s earlier correlation between American fear and dependence. 
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disabilities and twentieth century view of people with disabilities. However, during 
Roosevelt’s presidency, this cultural animosity of people with disabilities was vocalized, 
as proven within Roosevelt’s political strategies.  
A survey of Roosevelt’s accessories attests to Roosevelt’s awareness and 
manipulation of this credo. His leg braces were painted black to hide them amongst his 
socks and pant suit (Stein 38). He leaned on his sons and added extra support to his 
lectern for standing support to avoid using crutches (38). Doctor’s reports describing his 
physical health as near perfect were leaked to the media (38). Roosevelt’s public actions 
displayed a similar theme: when Roosevelt won the democratic nomination in 1932, he 
flew to Chicago to accept it in the flesh, a tradition unheard of at the time (Davis 22). 
Roosevelt did so, though, to prove the extent of his physical strength and fearlessness, 
which was amplified by the American public’s distrust in aviation at this time (23). The 
majority of Roosevelt’s posters showed only his face or him sitting at a desk, 
exemplifying the term “chained to his desk,” and publicizing a presidential image of 
Roosevelt that did not visibly portray his disability (Stein 39). 
 FDR’s camouflaged braces (Stein 36)   
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 FDR leaning on lectern for support instead of using crutches (37) 
 FDR leaning on son for support instead of using crutches (37)  
 FDR posters’ personifying the metaphor “chained to his desk” (38) 
Paradoxically, while hiding his disability, Roosevelt also initiated the first policy 
improvements for people with disabilities. In 1921, before his presidential election, 
Roosevelt created the Rehabilitation Center in Warm Springs, Georgia, and granted 
control to his law partner, Basil O’Conner, in 1928 due to his demanding campaign 
schedule ("NMAH”). O’Conner turned the Rehabilitation Center into a non-profit, which 
he named the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis. This non-profit raised money 
for polio research prevention and polio care, and O’Conner used Roosevelt’s name to 
increase its public visibility ("NMAH”). In 1938, actor Eddie Cantor changed the name 
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of the foundation to the “March of Dimes,” (its name today) which asked the public to 
send in dimes as their donations (Helfand, Lazarus, and Theerman).  
In 1935, Roosevelt passed the Social Security Act, “establishing federally funded 
old-age benefits and funding to states for assistance to blind individuals and disabled 
children and extending existing vocational rehabilitation programs” (“Disability Rights”). 
The SSA personified Roosevelt’s “highest aspirations: universal health care, old-age 
pensions, [and] unemployment insurance;” proof of Roosevelt’s dedication to helping 
individuals, such as those with disabilities, who had both health and economic hardships 
(Kennedy). The SSA also exemplified Roosevelt’s commitment to public reform, 
noticeable within his own words, when he said, “we are trying to construct a more 
inclusive society. We are going to make a country in which no one is left out” (Perkins 
113). And although “compromise after compromise whittled FDR's grand vision for a 
comprehensive system of social provision,” “those first steps have proved hugely 
consequential for generations of Americans,” such as the establishment of Medicare and 
Medicaid decades later, which improve the lives of people with disabilities today 
(Kennedy).3 
These welfare programs resulted from the WW1 to the mid - 1970’s social 
understanding of “disabilities.” Defined as "the medical model," disability was explained 
as a “medically determined deficiency, rooted in the individual, inevitably leading to 
significant limitations or even total inability to participate in work and other major 
aspects of social life” (Kimberlin 28). As this literally reads, a person with a disability 
                                                        
3 Medicare and Medicaid are government programs added as amendments to the SSA, signed by 
President Johnson in 1965, to “provide medical and health-related services to specific groups of 
people in the United States” (“What is Medicare/Medicaid?”).  
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was interpreted as lacking key components of the human form – they were mentally 
and/or physically “deficient” (33). The SSA appealed to this understanding of disabilities 
with its creation of a system of monetary and medical benefits that individually assessed 
the extent of that person’s “deficiency.” This valuation was based on the presumption that 
these individuals could not achieve social and financial independence, while ignoring the 
contradiction this language presented amidst Roosevelt’s personal achievements.  
Regardless, though, of the adverse representation of disability the SSA ascribed 
to, this political recognition of disabilities was a major victory for Roosevelt and for the 
disability rights movement. Verifying the success of this first achievement was the 1940 
establishment of The American Federation of the Physically Handicapped, the 1946 
creation of The National Mental Health Foundation, which “exposed the abusive 
conditions at facilities and became an impetus towards deinstitutionalization,” and 
President Truman’s “National Employ the Physically Handicapped Week,” also instituted 
in 1946 (“Disability Rights”). Contrary to Roosevelt’s minimal public exposure of his 
disability, his fight to pass the SSA clearly ignited the beginning formations of 
government programs to increase the visibility of disabled figures in public. 
However, because polio’s physical effects on the president were expertly curtailed 
in the media, parameters were unknowingly set for the construction of his memorial; a 
framework that would block its completion for decades to come. This would lead to 
architectural issues when configuring the representation of this country’s only four-term 
serving president in his official memorial. Would the architect include his physical 
disability? And if not, what would be their reasons for not including Roosevelt’s body? 
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Would his visual legacy be to erase his disability, while his political legacy worked to 
include disabled people into the term “American?” 
The first memorial depiction of Roosevelt on public property was easy to remove 
from the grasp of this perplexing representational dilemma: the dime. This coin was in 
part chosen in commemoration of Roosevelt’s work with the disabled population, and in 
particular, his role in creating the March of Dimes. And because of the size restrictions of 
a dime, this tribute avoided having to depict Roosevelt’s wheelchair (Stein 42).  
The next aspect of Roosevelt’s life debated post-mortem was the future of his 
articles of support, “the material props that had enabled Roosevelt to serve as president,” 
that were consistent accessories to his livelihood (43). Roosevelt’s attempts during his 
presidency to conceal these apparatuses followed into his posthumous depiction, as “his 
braces were considered too unsightly to be exhibited with other FDR memorabilia at the 
family home on the Hudson River.” Furthermore, “many of the ramps throughout the 
capital were removed as soon as Harry Truman assumed the presidency,” as ironically, 
“the Hyde Park estate in New York became difficult for those who have trouble walking” 
(43). The description of his braces as “unsightly” appeals to the disability logos at this 
time, and the reversion to an inaccessible Hyde Park Estate underlines the attempt to 
erase from history Roosevelt’s reliance on a wheel chair.  
Roosevelt’s internalization of the “the body politic” appears as well in his request 
to conceal the extent of his disability for future generations. In “The President’s Two 
bodies: Stagings and Restagings of FDR and the New Deal Body Politic,” Sally Stein 
argues that “just as he understood that the semblance of physical autonomy was essential 
to public acceptance, he also anticipated that few citizens after his death would want to 
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confront an explicit depiction of his impairment or his need to manage it” (43). 
Confirming this notion, Roosevelt described to Justice Felix Frankfuter his idea for his 
memorial: “‘[p]laced in the center of that green plot [in front of the National Archives in 
Washington D.C. should be] . . . a block about the size of this (putting his hand on his 
desk). I don’t care what it is made of, whether limestone or granite or what not, but I 
want it to be plain’” (qtd. Stein 43). Roosevelt’s vision materialized in 1966 and sits on 
the corner of 9th Street and Pennsylvania in Washington D.C., devoid of any 
representations of his disability. But Roosevelt’s admirers were unsatisfied with such 
simplicity, and enacted plans for a grander statement. However, this more ostentatious 
memorial would take half a century to execute, largely due to the issues Roosevelt 
anticipated (43).  
  
 
 
FDR’s desired memorial ("Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial”) 
 
A year after FDR’s death, the construction of a site in his honor was approved by 
a “congressional resolution” in July 1946, however, the Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
Memorial Commission took another ten years to form.4 Finally settling on West Potomac 
Park as the location for this memorial in 1958, the commission announced a contest for 
its architectural design in 1960, and as Stein describes: “the terms for a 1960 design 
competition were remarkably open, stipulating principally that the memorial be ‘a 
                                                        
4 I am unsure of why it took the commission ten years to form. 
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creative work of art and not a useful building . . . that look[s] . . . to the character and 
work of Franklin Roosevelt . . . and transmit[s] his living image to future generations’” 
(43). The vague guidelines and ambiguous language, such as “creative work of art,” and 
“character and work,” for the proposal were to allow for artistic leniency. However, this 
loose description also avoided any requirement for the physical display of Roosevelt; 
here abstract art was key. Because FDR’s disability was still a taboo subject, and the 
advancement of disability policy had only just begun, the congressional committee 
members perhaps hoped to avoid articulating how the architects should physically 
represent FDR. This loose language left the physical representation of Roosevelt up to the 
architect, thereby removing the responsibility in determining how FDR should be 
portrayed from the congressional committee (43). Many critics, however, thought it was 
absurd to believe that the public was unaware of Roosevelt’s disability. The argument 
went that such a public figure could not disguise such prevalent physical eccentricities 
(wheelchair, braces, etc.) because of his constant appearance in public (Clausen 25). 
However, as his eldest son, James Roosevelt, affirmed, “‘it amaz[ed] me how many 
people of that period were not even aware of father’s handicap’” (qtd. Houck 20).  
The FDR Memorial Commission received over five hundred applications and 
settled upon William Pedersen and Bradford Tilney as the winning designers. Like the 
many rejected plans, theirs “[featured] tall shafts ‘to express the inspiration and hope that 
Roosevelt gave to the world,’” and contained many steps and extremely tall planks (Stein 
44). Ironically, their memorial would have been inaccessible for Americans who, like 
Roosevelt, could not walk up “the ubiquitous terracing” (44). In response to their 
exclusion of any visual or explicit portrayal of FDR’s disabled body, the pair maintained 
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it was unnecessary due to the ample amount of publicly available photographs of 
Roosevelt (44). Slabs of material engraved with the President’s famous phrases reached 
as tall as 165ft to symbolize the “height” of Roosevelt’s presidential accomplishments 
(44). Because “the spare design of simple incised slabs ‘quite literally made FDR’s words 
his monument,’” they simultaneously functioned as a celebration of Roosevelt’s literal 
achievements, and a distraction from the missing depiction of Roosevelt, the man. Here, 
the visual representation of Roosevelt, or lack thereof, conceded to cultural 
interpretations of a disability. However, Roosevelt’s family disliked the absence of 
Roosevelt’s figure, leading to Pederson and Tilney’s resignation in 1965 (44).  
 Pederson and Tilney’s design (Stein 44) 
 While the commission renegotiated their strategy, the disability rights movement 
gained influence in federal policies. President John F. Kennedy was elected to office in 
1961 at the heart of the civil rights movement. This movement came to symbolize not just 
the liberation of African-Americans in society, but all groups of people marginalized due 
to their differences. The disabilities movement would eventually use the unifying strategy 
of the civil rights movement to alter public perception of disabilities, commencing after 
the 1970’s. However, improved political policy advancing their assimilation occurred 
first, granting the movement political clout for this future cultural fight. 
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Political sociologist Sarah E. Kimberlin remarks on the necessary compatibility 
between disability politics and social representations of disabilities, writing, “political 
participation of people with disabilities and the theories underlying governmental 
disability policies are rooted in shifting societal conceptions of the nature of disability” 
(28). Changing representations noticeably began in the 1940’s and 1950’s with the 
emergence of “parent activists . . . fight[ing] for education and services for children with 
disabilities” (“Self-Definition and Autonomy”). By the 1950’s, advancing medical 
technology increased the survival of people with “formerly fatal injuries and diseases,” 
and “efforts by this growing population of military veterans and young adults to 
participate fully in society gained momentum” (“Self-Definition and Autonomy”). The 
children with disabilities of this era grew up demanding this inclusion, sparking a need 
for new disability policy by the 1960’s.  
President Kennedy’s administration appealed to this desire, and “appointed a 
special President’s Panel on Mental Retardation [calling] for the deinstitutionalization of 
people with disabilities and increase in community services” (“Disability Rights”). 
Kennedy next signed “The 1963 Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Health 
Centers Construction Act,” which “authorized federal grants for construction of public 
and private nonprofit community mental health centers” (“Disability Rights”). Remarking 
on the creation of this act, President Kennedy said on October 24, 1963, “we can say with 
some assurance that, although children may be the victims of fate, they will not be the 
victims of our neglect” (“Disability Right”).  
Although Kennedy was killed nearly a month later, the push towards integration 
of people with disabilities into mainstream society had just begun. When Lyndon 
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Johnson took over as President in 1964, he continued advocating for people with 
disabilities. That year he signed the Civil Rights Act, Medicare and Medicaid were 
established in 1965 as amendments to the SSA, Veteran’s Affairs were expanded in 1965 
thanks to the Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments, “[authorizing] federal funds for 
construction of rehabilitation centers, expansion of existing VR programs and creation of 
the National Commission on Architectural Barriers to Rehabilitation of the Handicapped” 
in 1968, which “prohibited architectural barriers in all federally owned or leased 
buildings” (“Disability Rights”). These initiatives opened doors (literally) for people with 
disabilities, disproving the medical model’s devaluation of them, and fueling their 
imminent demand to change the political and cultural understanding of a disability.  
Coinciding with the restlessness of the disability movement was the veteran 
members of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Commission’s re-visitation of the 
construction of Roosevelt’s memorial. Rescinding the open competition in anticipation of 
bypassing the same conclusion as the previous plan, they asked Marcel Breuer to design 
the project (Stein 45). Breuer was a German immigrant, well known for his modernist 
approach to design, and perhaps the commission hoped his affinity for abstract art would 
better appeal to their visions of this commemoration (Gatje).  
Breuer’s proposal did indeed differ from that of the past. Instead of giant blocks, 
he showcased triangles of a much shorter stature only reaching 60 feet in height (Stein 
45). Breuer’s seven triangles would encircle a suspended cube of thirty-two feet, which 
would display a “reproduction of a photojournalistic portrait of FDR. Like a newspaper 
halftone, it was composed of dots that, depending on the viewer’s distance, would merge 
more or less into a recognizable image” (45).  
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 Breuer’s design (Stein 44) 
However, Breuer’s drawings failed once again to visibly depict FDR’s disability. 
This missing component upset the District of Columbia Commission of Fine Arts, who 
rejected the proposal in 1967, although the FDR Commission had previously accepted it 
in 1966 (45). The public explanation for denying this proposal was an artistic 
disagreement, claiming the portrayal of Roosevelt’s face was “too modernistic . . . and 
too trendy in its references to pop art” (45).  
Breuer’s design invoked many other criticisms as well that were directly related to 
the depiction of Roosevelt’s physical body. Critics condemned the minimal exposure of 
Roosevelt’s picture, which was disguised by the surrounding triangular sculptures (Stein 
45). His face, as a conglomerate of various sized spots, too closely resembled his 
appearance in the media. Some contended this display was evocative of Roosevelt’s 
“inaccessibility except via the mass media” because his head was his most circulated 
public image, which Breuer had cited as his reason for incorporating only Roosevelt’s 
face (45). Furthermore, the cube appeared to be suspended in mid-air, but was in fact 
reliant on a block, reminiscent of Roosevelt’s falsified media depictions as independently 
stable (45).  
Many interpreted this portrait of Roosevelt as mimicking Roosevelt’s relationship 
with the public and his disability: deceiving the public through tricks of image just like 
Breuer was deceiving the public through architectural tricks. Explaining his artistic 
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decision, Breuer said, “‘I chose the cube because it is the very center, the very base of 
form - practically perfect . . . The globe is comparable, but it isn’t static; it moves too 
much. I preferred the great stability, the ‘standing power,’ of the cube. FDR had ‘standing 
power’ too’” (qtd. Stein 45). Breuer’s metaphor visually articulated the disability logos 
because he incorporated the cube into Roosevelt’s physical illustration. Deeming it 
“practically perfect” defined Roosevelt as almost perfect too, and excluding Roosevelt’s 
body thereby iterated his disability as hindering to his political perfection. Breuer’s 
description of Roosevelt’s “standing power” confused his intentions as well, because 
Roosevelt could not independently stand; outlasting any other president by two terms, his 
power to stay, much more than stand, pertained to Roosevelt’s presidential career (45).  
The rejection by the District of Columbia Commission of Fine Arts proved that a 
key aspect of Roosevelt was missing from the memorial, however, this commission failed 
to articulate the details of their disapproval. This missing piece once more encapsulated 
public discomfort with admitting to Roosevelt’s physical disability. Public sentiment 
appeared to understand the need for such acknowledgement, yet no individual was 
willing to bravely admit this truth. 
After Breuer resigned from his project in 1969, the Memorial Commission took a 
five-year hiatus before consulting the Department of Interior for help locating the next 
proposal (45). During these five years, the disabilities rights movement would settle on a 
new mode for advancing disability representation, easing the next architect’s task of how 
he or she would configure Roosevelt and his achievements.  
Kimberlin argues this shift occurred in public meanings of disability as images of 
disability moved away from the medical model to what is known as the social model. 
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Within this (social) model, people with disabilities “were limited not by their physical or 
mental impairments per se but rather by society’s failure to consider their needs when 
designing the built and social environment” (28). Inaccessible architecture and urban 
design, as Kimberlin explains, create environments that make disabilities invisible. 
Kimberlin further writes, "'Disability is something imposed on top of our impairments by 
the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society'" 
(qtd. 29). As Kimberlin indicates, the environment itself enforces the invisibility of the 
disabled, administering their status as second-class, or minority citizens (as 
unAmericans). Further differentiating from the medical model’s individualization of 
disabled persons’ deficiencies was the social model’s emphasis on we, merging all 
disabled people into one disabled person with one resounding cause.  
Through the final decades of the 20th century, disability rights activists insisted 
that they, “the disabled,” were a minority group deserving of civil rights (Kimberlin 30). 
As Kimberlin asserts, “The movement emphasized the common experience of 
discrimination as a unifying identity” (30). Attaining civil rights promoted not just a 
chance at “material gains” (medical model) but also “empowerment and transformation 
of the consciousness of their members” by recognizing their strength in numbers and 
right to this fight (30). This struggle resulted in two transformative acts: the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), “enacted by Congress in 1975 to ensure that 
children with disabilities have the opportunity to receive a free appropriate public 
education, just like other children,” and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA), "a law embodying the sociopolitical view of disability and a civil rights model of 
disability" (“IDEA-;” Kimberlin 32). The IDEA and ADA encompassed the social 
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model’s application of “the disabled” by attempting5 to curb marginalization through 
increased educational and environmental accessibility; regardless of specific disability 
limitations, all people with disabilities could expect incorporation into public education 
and environments. The ADA accomplished public inclusion through initiatives like 
building codes, street codes, and workers’ rights protecting people with disabilities from 
discrimination, as well as permitting requests for adaptations at work (“Americans with 
Disabilities Act”).  
Although pivotal to the social model, “the disabled” also creates problems for the 
disabled identity. Shakespeare suggests that “one of the dangers of [this] essentialism . . . 
is that it provides a simplistic reductionism, an ‘us and them’ approach. While this is 
comforting and secure, it offers risks” (108). Shakespeare’s use of “essentialism” denotes 
the universal characterization of “disability” as encompassing all people with disabilities, 
politicized by the social model. “The disabled,” then, culminates within one body of 
people nullified by the same oppression, and thereby emphasizes the distinction between 
the disabled and the non-disabled. “The disabled,” as well, invalidates the unique 
experience of each individual with a disability based on their type and functionality 
(high-low) of disability, as well as the other aspects of that individual’s identity (sex, 
gender, race, class, etc). However, the inherent contradiction within the “disabled cause” 
is that both unification and individualization are necessary for advancing political and 
                                                        
5 I write “attempting” because IDEA and ADA exemplify political acceptance of public inclusion of 
disabilities, but social society retains marginalization, as I will later depict through close-reading of 
literal language.  
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social representations; one of the many paradoxes associated with the disability rights 
movement.6  
Accompanying this matured political attitude of disability was the congressional 
committee’s next memorial attempt. Oregon Senator Mark Hatfield, a memorial 
committee member, recommended modern architect Lawrence Halprin, a West Coast 
designer known for pioneering landscape architecture (Martin; Stein 45). Halprin’s 
proposal was accepted six years later in 1975, and gained preliminary approval in 1976 
from the District of Columbia Commission of Fine Arts (45). Complete funding for his 
project was not appropriated until the late 1980’s, due to setbacks from the Vietnam War, 
and ground was not officially broken until 1991 (45). Construction of FDR’s official 
presidential memorial began forty-six years after his death. 
This memorial consisted of numerous natural settings and various statues, 
including Franklin Roosevelt, Eleanor Roosevelt, and nine differing representations of 
citizens, designed by an array of architect’s chosen by Halprin (45). “Halprin’s plan was 
far more expansive, appearing to offer something for everyone, a middle-of-the-road 
compromise strategy that had an appeal in the war-weary, post-Watergate era . . . Instead 
of rising high, Halprin’s memorial would extend parklike over seven and one-half acres 
on one side of the Tidal Basin,” Stein explains (46). But Halprin, too, grappled with how 
to represent FDR’s physical body. As Stein reports, 
“In his notes from 12 March 1974 [Halprin] indicated that he would like 
something ‘bigger than life, standing with cape and cane and braces - 
                                                        
6 Extremely beneficial to a person with a disability’s life are both government welfare programs such 
as Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security Disability Insurance, and Social Security Income, resulting 
from the medical model, and the creation of the ADA and IDEA, stemming from the social model.  
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because that’s how most of us remember [FDR].’ Four days later, Halprin 
changed his mind . . . [and] also admitted to himself, ‘The statue issue is a 
tough one in terms of scale. Also should [FDR] be seated as he normally 
was when we saw him or standing . . . I think sitting is better-but how?’” 
(46) 
Halprin’s articulation of “standing” to imply a “bigger than life” attitude signified the still 
current relationship between power and physical strength. Yet his contemplation of 
incorporating Roosevelt’s braces and cane into this embodied ideal exposed advanced 
cultural willingness to represent Roosevelt’s disability. However, Halprin questioned 
how to depict Roosevelt seated, delineating, once again, uneasiness with memorializing 
Roosevelt’s wheelchair; Halprin only felt comfortable exposing so much of Roosevelt’s 
physical weakness. His quandaries also harp upon the falsity of media depiction during 
Roosevelt’s presidency because, although Roosevelt was most often usually depicted as 
seated, Halprin understood Roosevelt’s wheelchair was purposefully missing from these 
images (46).  
 
Halprin’s various standing and sitting statues (Stein 48) 
The issues interspersed throughout the construction of Halprin’s memorial do well 
to define the difficulties at the time both aligned with normalizing disabilities in society, 
and associating abilities with the word “disabilities.” His decision to include a number of 
standing and seated statues of ordinary citizens intended to distract the public from the 
position of Roosevelt’s body, whether seated or not (Stein 47). As Stein explains, 
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“Halprin must have hoped that amidst a throng of figures – some were standing, others 
were sitting - relativity would prevail and distract viewers from the long-vexing issue of 
how to visualize the leaders powers to govern and inspire” (47). The fear that Roosevelt’s 
disability would impede a visitor’s understandings of his success exemplifies the 
difficulties in altering the accepted concept associated with “disabled.”  
The final display of Roosevelt would function as a culmination of many ideas, as 
Halprin attempted to please both Roosevelt’s family and supporters (47). For example, 
his size would be larger than the other statues to display his overbearing presence, 
however he would be seated (47). As Stein details, 
“The three-dimensional rendering includes minor allusions to FDR’s 
physical impairment - the tiny wheels added discreetly to the high-backed 
armchair, disproportionately thin lower limbs, one of which juts out 
awkwardly from beneath the cape, and the rather abrupt postural shift 
between the arrangement of legs off to one side and the torso, hands and 
head facing forward - without directly acknowledging his handicap.” (49) 
The wheels Stein mentions are oddly placed at the bottom of Roosevelt’s chair and are 
hardly visible due to the giant cape hanging around his neck (47). This inclusion of his 
wheelchair, yet its diminutive presence, suggests Halprin’s determination to include 
Roosevelt’s disability without granting it any attention. The sculpture would therefore 
still exude power and strength due to Roosevelt’s magnified size, without the presence of 
his disability threatening this message, while visually ascribing to the disability logos. 
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Eastern’s FDR, where FDR’s dog and cape distract from his 
wheel chair (Stein 50) 
 
Contrary to the literal translation of the sculpted Roosevelt, the statute appears to 
echo Roosevelt’s attitude towards his disability. According to Stein, the minimal 
exposure of Roosevelt’s wheelchair renders it unacknowledged, very similar to 
Roosevelt’s public representation of himself and his disability (47). Neal Eastern was the 
architect chosen to design Roosevelt’s statue, and in Kelli Peduzzi’s children’s book, 
“Shaping a President: Sculpting for the Roosevelt Memorial,” she pictorially details 
Eastern’s sculpting process, among others, and writes, “‘Neil wants to suggest the 
disability but doesn’t want it to be the first thing people notice’” (qtd. Stein 49). And, as 
Stein argues, Peduzzi’s critique is illustrated as follows:  
“To defer consideration of the cloaked body, Estern lavished attention on 
the elaborately braided closures of the naval officer’s cape, the carving on 
the signet ring that adorns the left hand, the deep ridges of wrinkles in 
both hands and face, and the rhythmic waves of hair. In case these surface 
details are not sufficiently distracting, there is also the diversion of a dog 
posed beside the commander in chief.” (49) 
As this projection of Roosevelt displays, disability discourse of the 1990’s still struggled 
to accept Roosevelt’s disability as an accomplice to his political achievements. And 
although Roosevelt’s disability was finally included in his memorial, Peduzzi and Stein’s 
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criticism of Eastern’s work resounded within the disability rights movement; his 
wheelchair’s camouflaged presence did little to appease this audience.  
Disability activists, agreeing on their disapproval of Eastern’s artistic 
representation, could not agree on why they disapproved (Stein 50). Some blamed the 
public during the time of FDR’s presidency, claiming FDR did not want to hide his 
disability but did so out of a reaction to the social stigma of disabilities (50); others 
alleged that the media concealed FDR's disability more than he would have liked. 
Another argument advocated for emphasizing his disability because it provided the 
president with a source of strength due to his need to overcome adversity (50). Some said 
that had Roosevelt been alive today, he would have unarguably wanted to be a symbol for 
the disability rights movement (50). And finally, others admitted that Roosevelt may not 
have wanted to be a central figure for disability activism, however, “regardless of what 
Roosevelt did or wanted, identification of his disability at this time would provide needed 
inspiration” (51).  
Although by the 1990’s the movement had attained a plethora of political 
victories, the problems with Roosevelt’s sculpted display exposed how much further the 
movement had to advance. Yes, people with disabilities could take public transit, enter 
most buildings, and no longer had to worry about being fired for necessary adaptations. 
However, people with disabilities were still marginalized and expected to be less able to 
achieve success; disabilities were acknowledged yet still not accepted into the "us" 
majority, exemplified within Roosevelt’s visual articulation. Hoping that encompassing 
the president’s disability within his memorial would endorse the need for public 
acceptance of people with disabilities, “the mid-1990s disability activists began 
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advocating changes in representation of the president to indicate that his reliance on 
wheelchairs, braces, or canes corresponded to the condition of ‘millions of others living 
with disability,’” and as many activists alleged, Eastern’s work lacked this influence 
(Stein 51). 
Just as adamant, though, were those opposed to enunciating Roosevelt’s 
disability, with some claiming such a depiction would erase his presidential era’s 
representation of disabilities, thereby belittling the need for advancements (Stein 52). 
Others argued Roosevelt wanted to help those facing adversity, but not be categorized as 
one of them, “to remember him as disabled would be akin to taking his image in vain, 
violating his express wishes” (52). Here importance was placed not on the positive 
impact this memorial could have for the movement, but on accurately encapsulating 
history.  
Such varied interpretations of Roosevelt’s outlook on his disability glorified the 
discontinuity of the disability rights movement. Should disabilities be acknowledged, and 
if so, should they be highlighted within public discourse? Finally, though, a circulation of 
two photos of Roosevelt in his wheelchair, proving the wheelchairs existence, ended the 
debates. As President Clinton announced, “he would ask Congress to mandate inclusion 
of a second statue of Roosevelt, this time sitting in a wheelchair” (Stein 52). Some have 
taken issue with the size of the wheelchair, claiming the small wheels and tiny back make 
the wheelchair appear like it was made for a doll (52). However, disability activists in 
favor of altering Eastern’s sculpture could rest. 
The disability movement’s vacillating response to Eastern’s design raises the 
perplexing moral intent of Roosevelt’s memorial. That is – is the intention of a memorial 
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to memorialize the past for the sake of the present, or to remember the past as it was 
amidst the changing scope of present ideals? When Halprin searched the media for 
pictures of Roosevelt to aid his decision in the representation of the former president, 
almost all the photographs and posters he found displayed a seated president, or just his 
neck and face. Therefore, including Roosevelt’s wheelchair seemed to falsify aspects of 
his presidential career. That being said, the question remained, should this memorial 
enclose America’s past ignorance, or should it exhibit the advanced representations of the 
present (Stein 47)? 
Prominent Washington journalist Daniel Schorr adds another dimension to this 
query, as he questions the fox fur shawl missing from sculpted Eleanor Roosevelt and the 
missing cigarette holder from FDR’s statue, two of the Roosevelts’ distinguishing 
accessories (Kiewe 88). Schorr asks whether or not Eleanor would have been an animal 
activist today, retiring her fox fur, and whether or not Roosevelt would have discouraged 
cigarette smoking (88). Likewise, in lieu of Roosevelt’s dedication to appearing 
physically strong, it is presumptuous to assume Roosevelt would have campaigned for 
disability rights; or as Schorr asks, “why does everybody with a cause seem to know that 
FDR and Eleanor today would be sharing that cause” (88)? 
But the half-century long controversy of the Roosevelt memorial overruled the 
contemplation of such hesitations; the memorial was not intended for the Roosevelts or to 
acknowledge America’s past mistakes. In “The Body as Proof: Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Preparations for the 1932 Presidential Campaign,” Amos Kiewe writes, “disability rights 
groups, however, demanded that the biases of his own time not be countenanced in ours” 
(88). Roosevelt’s memorial had come to embody a vision larger than its contents, much 
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like Roosevelt’s larger than life presence. Finally showcasing the extent of Roosevelt’s 
disability, his memorial would officially function as a tool for advancing disability 
representation due to the inclusion of the president’s disability as a component of his 
successes. 
Roosevelt’s memorial was completed on May 2, 1997 (Stein 52). As Clinton 
proclaimed, “‘a statue portraying his disability will stand as a reminder to current and 
future generations of Americans that disability is a natural part of the human experience 
that in no way diminished the ability of a person to fully participate in all aspects of 
American life’” (52). Clinton here confirms the late twentieth century doctrine of 
disabilities, as exemplified within Roosevelt’s public display of his disability (or lack 
thereof), the media’s denial of his disability, and the hesitation of the various characters 
involved in creating the memorial to admit to his disability. The distance American 
cultural representation of disability has come surfaces within Clinton’s words, too, 
because of this eventual enforcement of prominently displaying Roosevelt’s disability in 
his memorial.  
 Clinton’s mandated second FDR sculpture (Stein 53) 
This public acceptance took decades to accomplish; however, the 
acknowledgement of a disability does not further advance the portrayal of a person with a 
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disability. This change in society’s representation of people with disabilities has in fact 
allowed for a continued iterance of past disability logos, as Kiewe writes,  
“Subsequent political and present-day attitudes make it amply clear that a 
man handicapped as Roosevelt was would stand no chance of reaching the 
White House today. In an age where pictures trump words, television 
would mercilessly fix in every viewer’s mind the very images of physical 
helplessness that FDR largely managed to avoid.” (92) 
Surfacing within Kiewe’s words is the current continued association between disability 
and weakness, and the ongoing relevancy of the “body politic.” Many critics agree with 
Kiewe’s assumption, dispelling the notion that cultural interpretations of disabilities has 
improved. And although Houck claims “the body’s performance was vital to one’s 
masculinity in the 1920’s,” clearly twenty-first century culture agrees with this claim. 
Our visual-media obsessed culture would likely dismiss Roosevelt as a presidential 
candidate due to the probable exaggerated media exposure of his disability; an 
articulation of the consistent cultural interpretations of a person with a disability 
throughout the last few centuries. 
Still today, then, the stigma of weak, helpless, and sickly loudly adheres to the 
concept of disabled. A disabled person is no longer removed from public representation, 
like in the past decades, however the presence of physical differences is still considered 
an abnormality. As current disability representation therefore confirms, public 
endorsement of disabilities has only made the vocalization of the disability logos socially 
acceptable.      
5. Transforming Language 
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A photographic account of Roosevelt’s Hyde Park estate appears in the May 29, 
1939 edition of LIFE magazine. The article includes this picture (“The Photographic 
Essay”): 
                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The caption below it reads: “The entrance hall, opening from the door under the portico, 
leads through an arched hallway to the library, whose parchment lamp can be seen behind 
sofa. Behind the President’s chairs is a statue of him done in 1911 when he was a senator. 
On the wall at right are paintings of burning ships” (“The Photographic Essay”). When 
quickly glancing at this photograph, a reader might see a room with furniture in it, and 
the caption would confirm this initial interpretation. However, upon a closer look, the 
reader might notice Roosevelt’s wheelchair; a rare public sighting in 1939. There is an 
odd dichotomy between the detailed components of this room in this caption, and missing 
detail describing the two types of chairs in the photograph. This missing detail 
exemplifies the interdependent relationship between visual images and words, as well as 
both of their representational influences on cultural interpretations.  
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Although the image includes Roosevelt’s wheelchair, the assumedly purposeful 
missing accentuation of this fact iterates LIFE’s hesitation to boldly disclose Roosevelt’s 
disability. Perhaps LIFE felt comfortable printing this picture because Roosevelt was 
halfway through his presidential career, thereby lessening the media’s caution towards 
exposing his disability. But in this situation, language is necessary to confirming the 
magazine’s intentional display of Roosevelt’s wheelchair. Based on LIFE’s description of 
this picture, one could surmise the public’s discomfort with Roosevelt’s disability, 
displaying the strength of language to capture social dogma; here linguistic representation 
trumps pictorial representation. An alternative argument surfaces as well - that in not 
defining the chair as a “wheelchair,” LIFE was normalizing the representation of a 
disability. However, social credo of the mid-1900’s caused the purposeful exclusion of 
FDR’s disability from his public representation, supporting the negative reading of this 
caption. The reading of this picture therefore confirms the influence linguistic 
representation has over cultural interpretations of visuals. 
So far, we have looked at the visual cultural representations, and subsequent 
linguistic representations, of Roosevelt’s disability, or the absence of any such visual and 
linguistic representations. The public visual display throughout his presidential career and 
majority memorial controversy is a message of the invisibility of disability. However, 
today’s visual-media centered culture renders this invisibility impossible, attesting to 
Kiewe’s claim that Roosevelt would not win a current presidential election. If one were 
only to examine the current visual display of a disability, the unavoidable encapsulation 
of public figures’ disabilities would appear to contradict the notion that cultural 
representations have not changed. But, when looking at other representations, specifically 
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linguistic representations of disability, these cultural representations remain consistent 
with the cultural representations of the past few centuries. Our disability lexicon, then, 
must be rewritten so that it includes the perspective of everyone (disabled and non-
disable). To accomplish this, the language used to discuss (to “name”) disability, and 
people with disabilities, must be inverted to expose the “other” perspective. 
Lauren witnessed one example of this inversion. She attended a panel of 
University of California, Berkeley students who use wheelchairs discussing their activist 
group called, “Are Cripples Screwed.” The subject of this panel was the normal sex-life 
of people with disabilities, and their name resulted in a play-on-words. Taking back 
ownership of the word “crippled,” these students removed the word’s pejorative 
interpretation that has become incorporated into our society’s terminology; crippled, in 
this instance, literally means people who have trouble walking (Hoffman). Afterwards 
Lauren told me, "For the first time I actually understood that I was in a room with people 
who sit through life instead of stand, not in a room with people with disabilities" 
("Lauren Hersch"). She, like me, has lived with a brother in a wheelchair her entire life, 
and yet it was not until she was a part of the minority that her perspective was inverted. 
Suddenly she was looking at the world from the perspective of the people in wheelchairs 
on stage, placing her in the “other” category as someone who often stood; roles were 
reversed and the disability lexicon was defined by this minority. 
Examining Kiewe’s final comments on current adverse implications of media 
exposure exemplifies the stagnation of cultural interpretation of disability, even amidst 
advancing government policy. Currently accepted literal phrases verify the consistence of 
these cultural interpretations, and the need to encompass minority perspective more 
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consciously into verbal language. For example, Roosevelt’s “standing power” was a 
metaphor for his strength as a four-time elected president, manifested too within the 
structural content of the first two memorial plans. When an individual presents an 
excellent speech or performs well in a play, they receive a “standing ovation,” excluding 
all individuals unable to stand and creating a similar analogy that furthers their 
marginalization (Coogan 180). A job well done is congratulated with an “outstanding 
performance,” or a “stand-up job,” and when an individual behaves poorly, they are 
metaphorically “looked down upon” (180). “Blind” “is used in colloquial English to 
imply ignorance or stupidity; i.e., ‘turned a blind-eye,’ ‘blind to the fact,’ or ‘What? Are 
you blind’” (“Style Guide”). When searching for the term "disabled" in a newspaper, 
"disabled" delineates the disengagement, or failure, of a machine, such as the phrase: 
"despite shooting from unidentified snipers that disabled their convoy's lead vehicle," 
making "disabled" synonymous with an inability to function (Gordon and Landler). In 
Major League Baseball, players are put on the "disabled list" when they are hurt, 
allowing the team to "temporarily add other healthy players," while defining "disabled" 
as unhealthy ("Disabled List - DL"). Disability, therefore, is linguistically enshrined, 
even in the twenty-first century, as a culmination of cultural representations of disability 
persistent throughout the last several centuries. 
Disability theorist Tom Coogan claims this literal negative contextualization of 
people with disabilities, and the word "disabled," oppresses people with disabilities; he 
labels it "oppressive language" (180). And, as the National Center for Disability 
Journalism explains, “using ‘blind’ as a synonym for ‘ignorant’ is inaccurate and 
perpetuates stereotypes,” an argument that applies to all of the phrases presented above. 
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These literal representations of disability reinforce the binary able/disable and the 
preference for able within society. Such accidental vocalization of the disability logos 
supports the need to change language to incorporate all people’s perspectives. 
Negative cultural representations of disabilities are re-iterated and confirmed 
every time such phrases are incorporated into language. As Brewster writes, “Non-
disabled society, being the dominant group, creates a discourse of disability that is 
inevitably ideological, encompassing as it does ideas regarding relative status and worth” 
(128). Here Brewster details language’s ability, when determined by the majority, to 
establish two different groups in society and depict the preferred group (non-disabled). 
Every time such language is used, the oppression of people with disabilities remains 
intact, and the individual with the disability consciously, or unconsciously, internalizes 
this oppression (S. Hersch). Their identity then results from this internalization, often 
negatively affecting their view of their own self-worth (S. Hersch). Therefore, looking at 
language used in connection to disabilities translates into cultural interpretations of 
people with disabilities, and helps to explain the still present undervaluation of a person 
with a disability in society.   
Language’s power to graph concepts of weakness onto the disabled identity can 
be exemplified within the term “caretaker.” In “Making ‘Care’ Accessible: Personal 
Assistance for Disabled People and The Politics of Language,” Christine Kelly explains 
the word “care” “as a complex form of oppression.” Kelly claims this oppression results 
from the assumption that people who are disabled are in need of dependence on someone 
else for their wellbeing (563).  Elaborating on this explanation, Kelly writes: 
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In the context of disability, care is haunted by the specters of 
institutionalization, medicalization and paternalistic charities which, in 
varying degrees past and present, systematically marginalize people with 
disabilities . . . literary and figurative institutions still exist worldwide and 
policy frameworks continue to reflect oppressive ideologies under the 
guise of ‘caring for’ people with disabilities.” (565) 
The idea expressed within this quote implies that “care” has come to mean a lack of 
control over oneself, complying with signifieds attached to the word “disabled.” And 
although political policy has advanced by acknowledging that a person with a disability 
needs extra help, the language of this policy devalues this political victory.7 Kelly 
demonstrates this interpretation through a comparison of a “caretaker” to a “personal 
assistant,” where the former implies a person helping an individual with a disability, and 
the latter pertains to a person helping an individual of great wealth and/or responsibility. 
But both personal assistants and caretakers have jobs requiring similar objectives: to run 
the errands and complete the tasks asked of them by their employer to ease their 
employer’s life. Both titles pertain to the same job, but personal assistant, equated with 
"'support’ or ‘attendant services,’" "are informed by the notions of choice and control,” in 
comparison to the word "caretaker," which denotes a reliance on another (Kelly 566). 
This dependence on another human being has become a defining negative aspect of 
having a disability,8 and society’s aversion towards dependence further restricts the 
integration of people with disabilities into the mainstream. 
                                                        
7 “Medicaid Caregiver”: Medicaid allocates money for an individual’s “caregiver.” Details of 
qualifications and monetary amount are state-based (“How Do I Become”).  
8 As Longmore earlier explains on pg. 10. 
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Above I provide clear examples within literal phrasing that encompass the 
disability logos, imprison it, and re-circulate it. But because language informs our reality, 
language also functions as a tool for changing cultural representations of disabilities. As 
Klages writes, “Material practices can be changed by legislations (such as laws requiring 
wheelchair accessibility and the availability of telecommunications devices for deaf 
people and blind people), but attitudinal barriers require the revision of cultural images 
and meanings” (Woeful Afflictions 3). Here Klages advocates for thinking beyond 
government policy when attempting to resolve the marginalization of people with 
disabilities.  
Kelly's suggestion to change the term "caretaker," provides an example of one 
area of "cultural images and meanings" that can be altered to create a positive view of a 
person with a disability (Woeful Afflictions 3). A few disability organizations have also 
adopted literal language as a platform for representational advancement by publishing 
variants of a “Disability Style Guide” online for current journalists (“Style Guide”). 
These are not forced rules for journalists to follow, nor read, but serve as resources for 
journalists covering stories about people with disabilities. The National Center for 
Disability Journalism, the Research and Training Center on Independent Living, the 
Society of Professional Journalists, Parent to Parent of New York State, and the Special 
Interest Group on Accessible Computing are the most comprehensive guidelines I have 
found, and provide an array of concerns within literal language wherein people with 
disabilities are adversely depicted. These organizations emphasize the use of person-first 
language (a person with ____), the current politically accepted disability lexicon, and 
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certain hampering portrayals of an individual with a disability. In specific, RTCIL9 
discusses “portrayal issues” as follows: “do not focus on disability, do not portray 
successful people with disabilities as superhuman or heroes, do not sensationalize a 
disability, do not use generic labels, put people first, emphasize abilities, do not use 
condescending euphemisms, do not imply disease, [and] show people with disabilities as 
active” (“Guidelines”).   
After a continuous three month survey of the online sites of the top three most 
widely circulated newspapers in the country (The Wall Street Journal, The New York 
Times, and USA Today, respectively), I have found a variety of articles that exhibit the 
lexical prejudices that RTCIL, and its fellow contemporaries, warn against. Through a 
close reading of these articles, I will explain what the implications of the authors’ 
particular word choices are, and then show how these phrases and/or sections can be 
rewritten to remove and/or alter the disability logos. In providing examples that 
incorporate said representations, I affirm the paramount need to further promote these 
resources, as well as identify additional antagonistic linguistic portrayals of people with 
disabilities. This process will articulate the effect these literal depictions have on the 
disabled identity that is both internalized by an individual with a disability, and displayed 
in nondisabled society. 
The first stage of this process analyzes the word choice and structure of sentences 
within these certain articles that intentionally, or unintentionally, display the disability 
logos. In “Autistic Man Breaks through Silence,” an article written by Emily Le Coz on 
July 14, 2013, a plethora of sentences exemplify this deterministic language. Such 
                                                        
9 Research and Training Center on Independent Living 
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sentences and/or phrases are as follows, wherein the phrases I proceed to rewrite are 
highlighted:10 “The last word Watson Dollar spoke before autism erased his ability to do 
so was ‘lights;’” “Watson had lost almost all of his 150-word vocabulary along with an 
interest in the world;” “The Dollars got the dreaded diagnosis on May 17, 1993;” “They 
did everything they could to loosen autism's grip, but it wouldn't let go;” “The disorder 
had permanently severed communication in their only child and, in doing so, isolated him 
from the world;” “Watson was lost, and he wasn't coming back;” “Because she doubted 
he'd understand a verbal explanation;” “Watson not only understood, but he was able to 
respond — albeit slowly and while clutching her hand;” “People like Watson who have 
autism suffer deficits;” “Hallmark signs of the disorder include a lack of eye contact, 
limited or absent language;”  “Others, like Watson, are labeled low functioning because 
they lack language and a means with which to connect to the world;” “the odd  behavior 
of the young man obscures his inner world;” “Watson leans back in his recliner and stares 
at the ceiling while unintelligibly reciting the script of a favorite movie;” “Otherwise, he 
seems lost, disconnected, on his own;” “‘These incessant questions,’ Watson replies . . . 
‘Incessant.’ Not a feeble-minded word.” 
Similar phrasing appears in “Challenged, but Determined to Compete for the 
Tiara,” an article written by Neil Genzlinger on June 23, 2013. They are as follows: 
“Challenged, but Determined to Compete for the Tiara: ‘Miss You Can Do It’ Showcases 
Challenged Girls;” “Others can’t speak or can barely be understood when they do;” “The 
                                                        
10 These sentences are rewritten later, and the highlighted sections are either removed or rewritten. 
The highlight is meant to call the reader’s attention to the section within the phrase (or entire 
phrase) that articulates a component of the disability logos. 
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parents of these children talk movingly about coming to grips with the news that their 
child would be disabled." 
And finally, “Theme Park Policy Angers Parents of Special-Needs Kids,” written 
by Rachel Richardson on June 13, 2013, includes the phrases: “Disabled guests now have 
to request a boarding time for rides, but autistic kids can go ballistic while they wait;” 
“Visits to the park eased his anxiety and offered a respite from the day-to-day challenges 
of living with autism.” 
At first glance, the importance of these phrases may seem trivial. But, as 
Saussure’s system of language and the linguistic relativity hypothesis explain, language 
determines cultural interpretations of concepts. These phrases verbalize signifieds 
associated with “disability,” and when an individual reads these articles, they are 
unknowingly adding these signifieds to their own interpretation of disabilities.  
These examples provide areas within these articles where an exchange of words, 
or re-organization of the article, would portray a disability differently. Coogan helps 
articulate this possibility through literary definitions given by twentieth century post-
structuralist Michel Foucault, and Saussure, writing, “in the Foucauldian view of 
discourse . . . the speaking/writing ‘subject’ is presented simultaneously as being subject 
to a non-negotiable cultural ideology, and as an agent that engages with cultural 
meanings that are ‘contingent, negotiable, and revisable’ (2002, 285)” (280). Foucault’s 
understanding of a subject’s relationship with society, then, becomes chained both to a 
culture’s unarguable belief system, as well as a person’s ability to discuss, and perhaps 
alter, such cultural beliefs. This would place the signifier disability, and its associated 
signifieds, as non-negotiable within the accepted cultural ideal, but also as a concept for a 
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person to discuss and play with. However, Coogan continues to write that when 
incorporating “Saussure’s structuralist theory of language . . . the subject agency that 
Foucault describes only [occurs] within the rules of a whole social system that demands 
subjection (2003, 165– 166)” (280). As Coogan’s thought delineates, modifying these 
“rules” provides the possibility for changing cultural interpretations of disabilities. This 
responsibility, however, lands on the verbal members of society, because those who are 
non-verbal lack the means that are necessary to create their own definition of disabled 
(Coogan 280). These non-verbal individuals have a lesser ability to offer an alternative 
lexicon because of social society’s emphasis on verbal language. Foucault articulates this 
preference within the binary speaking/writing, in which he claims the act of speaking is 
valued above writing in our culture (“Klages on Poststructuralism/Derrida”).11 And 
although all individuals with disabilities are not non-verbal, nondisabled society, being 
the majority dominant population, has greater influence over disability discourses.  
The authors of these articles use nondisabled diction, however, their language can 
be changed to become inclusive without nullifying their original intention(s). This 
malleability of language thereby confirms Longmore’s view of the disabled identity as a 
“constructed identity.”12 Coogan continues to explain that, “the possibility of finding a 
‘new language, and, therefore, new discourse to provide the means with which to speak,’" 
can lead to a disability as an experience that "‘can be expressed in a non-oppressive way 
ahead of language’s evolution’ (2003, 180)” (280). Based off Coogan’s logic, then, 
                                                        
11 Derrida’s speak/writing binary places spoken word and written word on opposite sides of the 
binary, where spoken word is preferred to written word in our culture (“Klages on 
Poststructuralism/Derrida”). 
12 First referenced and discussed on pg. 10 
Hersch 54 
 
restructuring these phrases can allow for narratives that are absent of the disability logos, 
and thereby reconstruct how these authors portray people with disabilities.   
Coogan’s solution can be applied to these articles by rewriting the aforementioned 
highlighted words. In “Autistic Man Breaks through Silence,” this first phrase, “The last 
word Watson Dollar spoke before autism erased his ability to do so was ‘lights,’” 
dramatizes the effect autism has had on Dollar’s communication, and places importance 
on the ability to verbalize a word. Instead, though, the sentence can read, “The last word 
Watson Dollar spoke before autism altered his mode of communication was ‘lights,’” 
implying autism changed Dollar’s usage of language, but did not rid Dollar of the ability 
to communicate. Deleting “erased” also removes the negative portrayal of the effects of 
autism on an individual. The phrase, “Watson had lost almost all of his 150-word 
vocabulary along with an interest in the world,” portrays Watson’s autism as having 
reduced both Watson’s intellectual abilities and his curiosities. In writing “the world,” Le 
Coz portrays the assumption that Watson’s now non-verbal language pertains to a 
disinterest in everything, again exaggerating the ways in which autism has affected 
Watson. Instead, writing “Watson had lost his ability to verbally communicate almost all 
of his 150-word vocabulary along with the same interest in his surroundings,” removes 
the assumption that losing verbal communication also means losing “vocabulary,” as well 
as a disconnection to the larger, verbal, world. When Le Coz writes: “The Dollars got the 
dreaded diagnosis on May 17, 1993,” she implies the subjective notion that becoming 
disabled should be feared, instead of specifically attributing this feeling to the Dollars’. 
However, writing, “The Dollars got the diagnosis they feared on May 17, 1993,” instead 
delegates this assumption to the Dollar’s interpretation of autism.  In the following 
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phrase: “They did everything they could to loosen autism's grip, but it wouldn't let go,” 
Le Coz personifies autism and describes it as having violently defeated Watson. Re-
writing the sentence as: “They did everything they could to limit how much autism would 
change Watson’s abilities, but had little success,” characterizes their efforts, instead, as 
trying to combat the severity of Watson’s autism, and removes this violent 
personification. The sentence, “The disorder had permanently severed communication in 
their only child, and in doing so, isolated him from the world,” denotes a now 
uncommunicative Dollar, and claims that being non-verbal has removed Dollar from 
majority society; here Le Coz marginalizes non-verbal individuals. Instead, writing, “The 
disorder permanently severed vocal communication in their only child and, in doing so, 
limited his interactions with the outside, vocal, world,” informs the reader of the 
particular form of communication Watson lost, and the possible effects this would have 
on Watson’s relationship with verbal society. In the phrase, “Watson was lost, and he 
wasn't coming back,” Le Coz seems to associate Watson with the communicative, non-
autistic boy he once was, and this now uncommunicative, autistic child as someone 
different. Here, the autistic Watson is described as unreachable; someone of “the other.” 
Instead, writing, “Watson had permanently changed,” denotes a change in Watson’s 
persona, but does not describe him as having become a different person. Within this 
phrase: “Because she doubted he'd understand a verbal explanation,” Le Coz portrays the 
assumption that having autism determines Dollar’s intellectual capabilities, seen again in: 
“‘These incessant questions,’ Watson replies . . . ‘Incessant.’ Not a feeble-minded word.”  
Le Coz again echoes this portrayal when she writes, “Watson not only understood, but he 
was able to respond — albeit slowly and while clutching her hand,” because of the 
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objective shock embedded within this phrase when the Dollar’s learned of Watson’s 
communicative abilities. Le Coz, here, also undermines his actions with her child-like 
description of his lethargy and fear. These phrases can instead be written as, “Because 
she was unsure if her son would understand a verbal explanation,” where “unsure” is 
more hopeful than “doubted;” “‘These incessant questions,’ Watson replies . . . 
‘Incessant.’ An intelligent word proving a complex mind,” and, “As he clutched her hand 
while typing slowly, Watson proved to his mother he could understand as well as 
respond,” which describes Le Coz’s subjective interpretation of the situation and places 
emphasis on Watson’s actions. When Le Coz writes, “People like Watson who have 
autism suffer deficits,” she invokes marginalization with “People like Watson,” and 
articulates autism as a disease. Instead, the sentence can read, “Watson, and others with 
autism, can display certain deficits,” thereby individualizing Watson and removing the 
association of suffering with a disability. The sentence, “Hallmark signs of the disorder 
include a lack of eye contact, limited or absent language,” presents Dollar’s mode of 
communication as a form that is excluded from language. Continuing this notion she 
writes: “Others, like Watson, are labeled low functioning because they lack language and 
a means with which to connect to the world,” while also describing his form of 
communication as an automatic eviction from majority society. Instead, these phrases can 
say: “Hallmark signs of the disorder include a lack of eye contact, some verbal or 
nonverbal communication;” “Others, like Watson, are labeled low functioning because 
they lack verbal language and a typical means with which to connect to the social world.” 
The word choice used here: “the odd behavior of the young man obscures his inner 
world,” describes Dollar as strange and thereby marginalizes people with atypical 
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behavior; seen again with: “Otherwise, he seems lost, disconnected, on his own.” When 
rewritten, such phrases read: “the unusual behavior of the young man obscures his inner 
world;” “Otherwise, he appears uninterested and disconnected,” in which his behavior is 
described as different, and removes Watson from a solitary, “other” space.  
In the article, “Challenged, but Determined to Compete for the Tiara,” the 
placement of the word “challenged” situates the focus of this title on these individuals’ 
disabilities, instead of on the individuals, themselves. The use of the word “challenged” 
as a descriptor for these individuals’ with disabilities is problematic, too, because it 
describes them as deficient. Instead, writing: “Determined to Compete for the Tiara, In 
Spite of Cultural Challenges,” places the focus of this title first on these individuals’ goal, 
and then explains why this goal might be challenging. Genzlinger repeats his focus and 
descriptor in the subtitle, when he writes, “‘Miss You Can Do It’ Showcases Challenged 
Girls,” conjuring up the image of a pageant that features deficient girls. The subtitle can 
be written instead as, “‘Miss You Can Do It’ Includes Girls with Disabilities,” 
emphasizing inclusion, and focusing on the girls first, and their disabilities second. When 
Genzlinger writes, “Others can’t speak or can barely be understood when they do,” he 
inaccurately describes their communicative (dis)abilities, and also articulates his 
experience as a fact. Instead, the sentence should be written as, “Others are nonverbal or 
might be difficult to understand,” detailing why the individual would not be able to 
speak, and removing certainty from the inability to understand s/he. When writing, “The 
parents of these children talk movingly about coming to grips with the news that their 
child would be disabled,” Genzlinger emphasizes these parents’ disheartening 
experience, and subsequently portrays the notion that a disability would negatively alter 
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these families’ lives. Instead, the sentence can read, “The parents of these children talk 
movingly about the journey of raising a child with a disability,” removing the subjective 
negativity from this phrase.  
In “Theme Park Policy Angers Parents of Special-Needs Kids,” the subtitle 
emphasizes the disability of the individuals, determines a difference, and preference, 
between people with disabilities and autism, and exploits an autistic child’s possible 
reaction for sarcastic intent. This subtitle reads: “Disabled guests now have to request a 
boarding time for rides, but autistic kids can go ballistic while they wait.” This 
nonsensical sentence could possibly be rewritten as, “Guests with certain disabilities now 
have to request a boarding time for rides, which parents fear may upset their autistic kids, 
who do not qualify for this privilege.” When rewritten, this subtitle does not distinguish 
between individuals with disabilities and autistic children. Here, as well, the 
incorporation of details that explain what the article will continue to discuss removes the 
subtitle’s emphasis on disabilities. Later, Richardson incorporates a personal 
interpretation of autism into an objective description, when she writes, “Visits to the park 
eased his anxiety and offered a respite from the day-to-day challenges of living with 
autism.” Instead, this sentence can be written as: “Visits to the park eased his anxiety and 
offered a distraction from day-to-day activities that Gage found challenging,” specifically 
attributing the “challenges” to an individual’s experience.  
The above rewritten phrases are cause for concern because of the disability logos 
that they reiterate. These authors enact the many signifieds of disability that this paper 
has discussed, linguistically communicating current cultural representations of people 
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with disabilities that align with the past. The risks of essentialism13 surface within these 
sentences, where the depiction of these individuals with disabilities stem from cultural 
representations of “the disabled.” And while rewriting these phrases helps dilute the 
perpetuation of these two groups, these articles’ narrative angles delineate this notion, 
too.   
In Le Coz’s article, this detrimental attitude is displayed as follows:14 
“The smiling, inquisitive boy who'd sung and pranced around his house in Magee now 
sat sullen and withdrawn. He rarely spoke. Instead of saying ‘juice’ or ‘outside,’ Watson 
met his needs by tugging the nearest adult to the refrigerator or the backdoor.” 
Le Coz’s choice to describe Dollar as a once “smiling, inquisitive boy who’d sung and 
pranced around his house,” but now appears, “sullen and withdrawn,” portrays a person 
with autism as the antithesis to a happy, interactive being. This section enacts the 
understanding that once Dollar became autistic, his language, as well as his enjoyment, 
disappeared. However, autism does not necessarily alter a person’s state of happiness. 
Furthermore, a person’s ability to speak does not dictate their level of contentment, 
either. Le Coz places Watson in the category of “other” due to his now supposed 
disinterest and inability to participate in the typical, verbal world. And although these 
sentences can be re-written, words have to be removed, and the point of view of this 
paragraph must be altered, as well, to portray the effects of autism differently. 
“The Dollars got the dreaded diagnosis on May 17, 1993 — 10 days after his second 
birthday — autism — and took immediate action.” 
                                                        
13 Explained by Shakespeare on pg. 31. 
14 The italicized sections are taken from the articles, and the discussion is beneath them without 
italics. 
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Although I re-word this sentence earlier to make it subjective, the idea that having a 
disability lessens the quality of one’s life still remains; the word should all together be 
removed. Even though I cannot change the way the Dollar’s view Watson’s diagnosis, 
incorporating this opinion into the article merely reiterates adverse cultural interpretations 
of disabilities. 
“Pam and Donald eventually accepted reality: The disorder had permanently severed 
communication in their only child and, in doing so, isolated him from the world.” 
This sentence is rewritten earlier as well, however, Watson’s disability is here used as a 
ploy to invoke the reader’s empathy, depicting a disability as something to be pitied. 
Autism is here described as a proponent in removing Watson from the typical, verbal 
world, placing Watson within “the other,” and belittling his new reality.   
“His own mother often wondered, ‘Is he even in there?’” 
Here I am incapable of re-wording a quote, however the incorporation of this quote 
furthers the depiction of a person with a disability as an alien being. Watson’s autistic 
diagnosis supposedly renders him unrealizable and unreachable. By exhibiting this quote 
within her article, Le Coz circumvents the notion that he has become a foreign entity; 
something unknown to the typical world. 
“That question lingered two decades, until, on Nov. 11, 2011, Watson sent a postcard 
from the other side.” 
Le Coz here literally places Watson in the group of “the other” when she writes “the 
other side.” However, even though Watson is autistic and views the world differently 
than a typical brain might, he still remains a part of society. This sentence should either 
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be removed or entirely rewritten to simply say “Watson verbally communicated with his 
parents on Nov. 11, 2011.” 
“And with that, Watson cracked a door between two worlds long ago severed by autism. 
That door would open again and again in the months that followed, each time revealing 
more of the young man who'd been trapped behind it for years.” 
Yet again, we see within this paragraph division between Watson’s reality and a typical 
reality within the metaphor of “a door between two worlds.” But it is not so much that 
Watson was “trapped” due to his autism, but that a mode of mutual communication 
between Watson and his parents had yet to be discovered. Le Coz faults his autism for his 
disconnection to majority society, instead of the exclusivity of majority, verbal language. 
Here Le Coz articulates cultural understandings of Watson’s disability by placing him in 
an incommunicable “other” space. This section must be entirely rewritten to portray an 
inclusive interpretation of people with disabilities in society. 
“Children with autism don't get pleasure from connection and thus lose their motivation 
to communicate.” 
This generalization pertains to a commonly misunderstood interpretation of people with 
autism. Although it may be true that some autistic children feel this way, not all do, 
known to me through my recent work with autistic children. This sentence references Le 
Coz’s research, however, it also depicts children with autism as experiencing reality in 
the same way. This discussion of “connection” further articulates the distance between 
people with autism and people without, speaking to the “us” and “them” distinction 
within our cultural. I believe, though, it is safe to assume most people crave personal 
connection, however, this can be attained in many forms. This paragraph, instead, should 
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discuss Watson’s form of personal connection, and his difficulty attaining it in verbal 
society.  
“Otherwise, he seems lost, disconnected, on his own.” 
Although I remove “lost” and “on his own” when I rewrite this sentence above, Le Coz’s 
remaining description of Watson still articulates Watson as existing within the “other” 
space. Here Le Coz portrays Watson as someone, something, unknowable to majority 
society. However, this perception stems from majority society’s minimal understanding 
of the autistic brain, and not from autism’s effect on Watson.  Watson “seems lost, 
disconnected, on his own” because Le Coz is unfamiliar with Watson’s persona. Le Coz, 
though, only needs to use the term “disconnected” to articulate her feeling of 
disconnection to Watson. Including the other descriptors only reinforces the alienation of 
an individual who acts in ways that are different than majority society is comfortable 
with.  
This article’s conclusion, however, presents a very different view of a person with 
autism then is interwoven throughout the majority of this article, reading:  
“‘Presume competence,’ Pam said. ‘Presume they're absorbing everything. Expose them 
to the world, and never give up. He was 20 years old when his big breakthrough came. It 
can happen.’”  
The focus of this article should be the Dollar’s amazing discovery and new found, 
communicative relationship with their son after decades of rare interactions. However, as 
exemplified within the earlier phrases, Watson’s perceived alien actions, as a result of his 
autism, steal the spotlight.  Le Coz, then, must have felt that the article would have 
greater appeal if she emphasized Watson’s ability to emerge out of his “other,” unknown 
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space, and exist within the accepted “us” space. Within her decided angle is the hesitance 
to describe a person with a disability as instinctively a part of “us,” contrary to Mrs. 
Dollar’s final advice to “presume competence.”   
In Richardson’s article, a few sections denote a similar display of people with 
disabilities, iterating not just a need for re-writing, but a need to restructure the angle of 
the article. They are as follows: 
“Disabled guests now have to request a boarding time for rides, but autistic kids can go 
ballistic while they wait.” 
As the article’s subtitle, this sentence should further detail the components of the article, 
and inform the reader of the article’s focus. That said, this subtitle accomplishes neither. 
Instead, this subtitle immediately engrains an image of a “ballistic” autistic child in the 
reader’s mind before s/he even reads the article. The missing specifics as to why the child 
may be upset, places the articles focus on this exaggerated possible side-effect of an 
amusement park’s disability policy change. However, this article actually discusses the 
pros and cons of this new policy, and exemplifies an autistic child’s frustration as one 
possible con. Richardson also seems to imply that there is a distinction between “disabled 
guests” and “autistic children,” where the former group is receiving the preferred 
treatment that the latter group deserves. The depiction of the article’s angle then, based 
on this subtitle, is the exaggeration and generalization of autistic children’s tendencies for 
tantrums, instead of focusing on the new policy.  
“‘I'm not asking for free admission to the park or everybody stop the world for him to get 
on,’ said Marcy Mullins, a Harrison, Ohio, mom of an 11-year-old autistic boy. ‘I would 
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like to just see him happy, and if he can ride a ride a few times, it would mean the world 
to me.’” 
As mentioned earlier, I cannot re-write a quote. However, Richardson exposes her desire 
to evoke a reader’s sympathetic connection to her article with the inclusion of this quote. 
Here, pitying people with disabilities is literally entangled within Mullins’ cry for help. 
Mullins tries to appeal to a reader’s maternal instincts, as she deems this amusement park 
the sole proprietor of her son’s happiness. The reader should thereby feel sorry for both 
the son, whose autism has supposedly emptied his life of happiness, and the mother, who 
only wants to see her son smile. However, by incorporating this quote, Richardson further 
marginalizes people with autism. This quote articulates the assumption that his disability 
limits his ability to be happy, and therefore majority society should exempt her son from 
societal rules. Her son, then, becomes banished to “the other,” a space that exists outside 
of societal norms. 
“The policy change presents problems for children with autism, who thrive on routine 
and order and have difficulty waiting in or out of line, parents say.” 
Generalizations of autistic children’s behaviors are made within this sentence. Having 
recently visited an amusement park with children with autism, I know that many autistic 
children can, in fact, wait in line. But due to cultural generalizations of “the disabled,” 
these children are exempt from societal expectations. Instead, an attempt should be made 
to teach an autistic person rules that allow them to participate in general society, which 
would include them into the majority. This sentence should therefore be removed or 
pertain to an individual.   
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In an article written by Paula Span on July 8, 2013, titled “High Disability Rates 
Persist in Old Age,” she begins with an assumed cultural sentiment of disabilities, and 
thereby sets the tone for the rest of her article. Her first paragraph reads: 
“Weird berries. Capsules of unpronounceable supplements. Yoga or tai chi. Crossword 
puzzles. Such amulets, we’re told, may ward off disability — which is the real fear that 
accompanies aging, isn’t it? Not the sheer number of years that will have passed, but the 
things we’ll no longer be able to do.” 
This section can be rewritten to read: “Such amulets, we’re told, may ward off becoming 
disabled- an increasingly likely possibility as an individual gets older,” which would 
remove the article’s implication that our culture fears becoming disabled. But even with 
this rewriting, this paragraph still embeds the desire to avoid becoming disabled within 
the remainder of the article. This introduction perpetuates the readers internalization of 
the notion that as we get older, we fear becoming disabled – but is this the real fear? Who 
decided it was so? And furthermore, Span’s use of the word “disabled” implies its literal 
definition of “not able.” Although becoming disabled later in life diminishes an 
individual’s abilities, the individual may still accomplish what they once could 
accomplish via other means. The central claim of the article rests on the still high number 
of elders becoming disabled despite supposed advancements in health and technology. 
That said, Span’s beginning is more concerned with the fear of being disabled than the 
inability to reduce the likelihood of becoming disabled. Within this opening, Span 
manages to assign both fear and a poor quality of life to the concept of a disability, 
regardless of my rewrite.  
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Cultural Effect of Linguistic Representation: 
 
The language used in these articles to describe people with disabilities 
demonstrates majority society’s interpretation of “normal” and “not normal;” signifieds 
of the signifiers “us” and “them,” respectively. As an oppressed minority, “the disabled” 
have a minimal influence over how they are linguistically represented. Our language, 
then, mainly presents the view of nondisabled majority society. In re-writing sections of 
these articles, I have attempted to rid language of this hegemonic institutionalized 
privilege by using language ascribing to the perspective of both nondisabled, and 
disabled, society.  
The deconstruction of able/disable is an integral component of this inclusive 
language. As Shakespeare writes, “perhaps the maintenance of a non-disabled identity in 
the context of physical limitation is a more useful problem with which to be concerned: 
rather than interrogating the other, let us rather deconstruct the normality-which-is-to-be 
assumed” (96). Here Shakespeare shifts the spotlight from trying to normalize cultural 
interpretations of people with disabilities, to reconfiguring the socially constructed ideal 
“normal;” “normal” implying a typical physical appearance, and a sound mental 
appearance through the use of total verbal language and normative social connections. 
Shakespeare continues to write, “a wider problem . . . is that everyone is impaired 
(Sutherland, 1981) . . . If everyone is impaired, we face difficulties if we seek to identify 
disabled people on the basis that they experience particular physical deficits not shared 
by the majority population” (96). As Shakespeare concludes, the able/disable, us/them, 
binary deconstructs when “impairment” replaces the descriptor “disabled.” For a binary 
Hersch 67 
 
to remain true, two distinct categories must exist; in particular, people who are able and 
people who are not able. This binary serves as the center of cultural beliefs and portrayals 
of people with disabilities in its embodiment of the disability logos. But because a 
disability simply means an impairment, this binary’s truth flounders amidst 
Shakespeare’s claim of the universality of human impairment. Society must then re-
create the idealized normal based on the fact that everyone is, in some aspect, imperfect. 
Our society’s lexicon, and subsequent cultural interpretations of people with 
disabilities, has refused to acknowledge this deconstruction. Linguistic representation 
thereby continues to circulate cultural representations of people with disabilities that 
articulate the disability logos. As discussed throughout this paper, language preserves 
cultural truths, while also reinforcing them. Therefore, the authors of these articles are not 
to blame for how they portray people with disabilities. In most circumstances, they are 
merely subconsciously continuing this tradition of disability portrayal that is rooted 
within our accepted language. Contrary to Shakespeare’s claim, then, able/disable 
remains intact within these linguistic portrayals of people with disabilities. Readers of 
these articles consume the beliefs articulated within these articles, and unknowingly 
incorporate them into their perception of people with disabilities. People with disabilities 
are than pitied and separated from majority society as a result of what nondisabled 
persons have read and/or heard.  
5. Conclusion 
In lieu of universal impairments, every individual within this world excels at 
particular abilities and struggles with others. In “The Opportunity of Adversity,” Amy 
Mullins mentions another important logos, that "what has always been a truth,” is “that 
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everyone has something rare . . .  and that the human ability to adapt is our greatest 
aspect" (7:23). Because physical society has been built by nondisabled, majority society, 
people with disabilities were born with a superior ability to adapt, a key to human 
survival since the world began. Mullins, here, manages to not only deconstruct 
able/disable, but to invert it, too.  
In “My 12 Pairs of Legs,” Mullins relays an interaction in which she was asked if 
she had the ability to choose her height. In response to Mullins’ admittance, that, yes, she 
could choose from five different heights, the woman said, "but Aimee, it's not fair that 
you can change your height when you want it" (8:13). Mullins’ adaptation, which 
requires the usage of prosthetic legs, has enabled her with an ability a person without 
amputated legs does not have, but desires. In a society that has placed people with 
disabilities in a category of being born with unfair circumstances, Mullins has placed 
herself, the amputee, in the superior category, once more inverting able/disable. 
Although Mullins proves the ability to invert able/disable, it has yet to be 
incorporated into cultural representations and interpretations of people with disabilities. 
As Mullins says, "the only real and consistent disability . . . is the world ever thinking 
that I could be described by those definitions" (of a disability) (“The Opportunity of 
Adversity” 10:13). The disabled identity is unique in that it only exists within a cultural 
construction, as Longmore mentions earlier, and I linguistically exemplify. Based on my 
research on the importance of language in determining cultural behavior, and accepted 
cultural truths, I believe reforming the way people with disabilities are written, read, and 
discussed about is a key to minimizing the disabling effects of cultural attitude towards 
people with disabilities. 
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The disabled body unarguably is an abnormality within majority nondisabled 
society. That said, this abnormality does not have to mean that this individual must be 
treated as abnormal. Therefore, normalizing the concept of a disability is necessary to 
including people with disabilities into nondisabled society.  
In concurrence with the notion of disability as a cultural construct, Harpur 
advocates for the removal of the word “disabled” from our lexicon. Harpur categorizes 
the term “disability” as “ableist nomenclature,” which is “the ability to describe 
discrimination without the necessity to define what impairments constitute a disability” 
(331). As Harpur here states, the term “disabled” lacks specificity, and merely 
“describe[s] a person with different abilities by reference to what they are not” (330). 
Majority nondisabled society, then, has created this descriptor that specifically references 
these individual’s outwardly identifiable abnormalities. Instead, Harpur suggests using 
the word “impaired” because of the word’s inclusivity; everyone, at some time, is, has, or 
will be, impaired. For example, a pregnant woman temporarily reliant on elevators would 
be one of many in need of a physical adaptation (people in wheel/power chairs, people 
with strollers, on crutches, etc.). Abled/disabled, here, deconstructs within political and 
cultural interpretations of a person with a disability because all types of impairments, 
temporary and permanent, are encompassed into the “impaired” identity. 
That said, let us look at this picture one more time: . 
Which one of us has the impairment?  Sam, whose physical impairment surfaces within 
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his body’s abnormal configuration? Or Lauren, whose eyesight necessitates her reliance 
on glasses to perfect her vision; her visual impairment. And what about my inability to 
remember names, dates, and information for longer than ten minutes; my mental 
impairment. Now that the “hidden” impairments in this photo are exposed, too, who here 
is disabled? All? None?  
When the descriptor “disabled” becomes replaced with the word “impaired,” the 
stable cultural understanding of a person with a disability falters, just like I have been 
unsure my entire life of how to describe my brother. This confusion deconstructs the 
cultural understanding of “the disabled,” and confuses the identity of a person with a 
disability, too. However, “the disabled” also provides a source of pride, a source of 
strength, and a cause to fight for for many individuals with different abilities. This 
paradoxical need to rid and keep “disability” in cultural diction emphasizes the 
importance in changing many forms of the disability discourse. If all this drama can 
emerge from one word, surely the importance of changing our accepted disability lexicon 
cannot be too hard to imagine. 
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An Interactive Guideline for Writing and Conversing About People with Disabilities 
 
WORD CHOICE 
1. Do not imply that non-verbal communication means a lack of intelligence 
Ex.: “Watson had lost almost all of his 150-word vocabulary along with an 
interest in the world” (Le Coz). 
Cultural implication: A non-verbal individual does not understand a verbal 
individual, nor is interested in anything. 
Rewritten: “Watson had lost his ability to verbally communicate almost all of 
his 150-word vocabulary along with the same interest in his surroundings.” 
New implication: A non-verbal individual cannot verbalize words, causing a 
change in this individual’s interests because of an inability to participate in a 
verbal interaction. However, non-verbal is no longer equated with a 
generalized disinterest and less intelligence. 
 
2. Do not objectify a subjective interpretation of a disability 
Ex.: “The Dollars got the dreaded diagnosis on May 17, 1993” (Le Coz). 
Cultural implication: The diagnosis of autism is feared; having autism is bad.  
Rewritten: “The Dollars got the diagnosis they feared on May 17, 1993.” 
New implication: In attributing this fear to the Dollar’s personal 
interpretation of autism, autism remains a neutral diagnosis. 
 
 
Hersch 72 
 
3. Do not personify a disability, especially in a violent and/or negative way 
Ex.: “They did everything they could to loosen autism's grip, but it wouldn't 
let go” (Le Coz). 
Cultural implication: A disability is to blame for why the individual has 
become disabled. 
Rewritten: “They did everything they could to limit how much autism would 
change Watson’s abilities, but had little success.” 
New implication: A disability is no longer portrayed as a victor, demonizing 
the disability. Instead, a disability is portrayed neutrally. 
 
4. Do not equate non-verbal with non-communicative and confinement 
 Ex.: “The disorder had permanently severed communication in their only 
child and, in doing so, isolated him from the world” (Le Coz). 
Cultural implication: An individual who cannot communicate using the 
English, verbal language is therefore unable to communicate, and confined to 
a solitary space. 
Rewritten: “The disorder permanently severed verbal communication in their 
only child and, in doing so, limited his interactions with the outside, verbal, 
world,”  
New implication: Autism can make an individual non-verbal, however, this 
does not necessitate isolation. There simply is a disconnection to the English, 
verbal world because of mistranslation. 
 
Hersch 73 
 
 
  
5.  Do not describe a person with a disability as existing outside society 
Ex.: “Watson was lost, and he wasn't coming back” (Le Coz). 
Cultural implication: A non-verbal individual is an alien being and will never 
be the person they were before they became disabled. 
Rewritten: “Watson had permanently changed.” 
New implication: Having a disability changes an individual, but does not 
create a new individual nor place them in an unreachable space. 
 
6. Do not equate the effects of a disability to the effects of a disease 
Ex.: “People . . . who have autism suffer deficits” (Le Coz).  
Cultural implication: A disability causes a person to suffer. 
Rewritten: “Watson, and others with autism, can display certain deficits.” 
New implication: Autism can have specific effects on individuals. 
 
7.  Do not equate non-verbal with not having a language 
Ex.: “Hallmark signs of the disorder include a lack of eye contact, limited or 
absent language” (Le Coz).   
Cultural implication: There is only verbal language, therefore a non-verbal 
individual has no language. Their language is not a language. 
Rewritten: “Hallmark signs of the disorder include a lack of eye contact, some 
verbal or nonverbal communication.” 
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New implication: Although non-verbal individuals have a language, their 
language does not use the words understood as verbal language. 
 
8. Do not describe unfamiliar behavior as strange behavior 
Ex.: “The odd behavior of the young man obscures his inner world” (Le Coz).  
Cultural implication: A person whose actions are unfamiliar is a weird 
person. 
Rewritten: “The unfamiliar behavior of the young man obscures his inner 
world.” 
New implication: It is difficult to read a person whose actions are seemingly 
nonsensical.  
 
9. Do not describe an individual with a disability as isolated 
Ex.: “Otherwise, he seems lost, disconnected, on his own” (Le Coz). 
Cultural implication: Because this individual is non-verbal, he seems unable 
to fit into society.  
Rewritten: “Otherwise, he appears uninterested and disconnected.” 
New implication: There is a disconnection here and he seems to be 
uninterested. 
 
10. Do not focus on a disability instead of an individual; Do not describe the 
individual as “challenged” 
Ex.: “‘Miss You Can Do It’ Showcases Challenged Girls” (Genzlinger). 
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Cultural implication: These individuals are foremost disabled; they are not 
individuals but are “challenged” people who will be placed on display at this 
pageant. 
Rewritten: “‘Miss You Can Do It’ Includes Girls with Disabilities.” 
New implication: The focus here is on the inclusion of individuals with 
disabilities into a usually nondisabled population of contestants. 
 
11. Do not imply that a disability reduces the quality of that individual’s life 
Ex.: “Visits to the park eased his anxiety and offered a respite from the day-
to-day challenges of living with autism” (Richardson). 
Cultural implication: Autism makes every day difficult for an individual. 
Rewritten: “Visits to the park eased his anxiety and offered a distraction from 
day-to-day activities that Gage found challenging.” 
New implication: Here autism is presented as neutral, and the challenges are 
contextualized, removing the negative portrayal of autism. 
 
12. Do not describe the actions of a person with a disability as crazy 
Ex.: “Autistic kids can go ballistic while they wait” (Richardson). 
Cultural implication: A person with a disability is going crazy, implying the 
consciousness of their actions. 
Rewritten: “Not sure of why they must wait in line, autistic children may get 
very upset.” 
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New implication: An autistic person may not understand certain situations, 
causing them to become in proportionally upset. 
 
 
POINT OF VIEW 
1. Do not describe a person with a disability as an antithesis to happy, 
interested, capable, etc.  
Ex.: “The smiling, inquisitive boy who'd sung and pranced around his house 
in Magee now sat sullen and withdrawn. He rarely spoke. Instead of saying 
‘juice’ or ‘outside,’ Watson met his needs by tugging the nearest adult to the 
refrigerator or the backdoor” (Le Coz). 
Areas of concern: “now sat sullen and withdrawn;” “Instead of saying . . . met 
his needs by tugging.” 
Cultural implication: An autistic person is no longer happy or interested in 
his/her surroundings, and his or her actions have been reduced to that of a 
child. 
 
2. Do not make the focus of an article a general claim about disabilities 
Ex.: “Such amulets, we’re told, may ward off disability — which is the real 
fear that accompanies aging, isn’t it? Not the sheer number of years that will 
have passed, but the things we’ll no longer be able to do” (Span). 
Area of concern: “the real fear;” “the things we’ll no longer be able to do.” 
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Cultural implication: Everyone fears becoming disabled, and this fear is the 
fear of not being able to do things we once could do. This fear of a disability is 
thereby embedded within the remainder of the article. 
 
3. Do not portray a person with a disability as existing outside society 
Ex.: “That question lingered two decades, until, on Nov. 11, 2011, Watson 
sent a postcard from the other side” (Le Coz). 
Area of concern: “sent a postcard from the other side” 
Cultural implication: A person with a disability exists in the “other” space, 
outside of majority, nondisabled society. 
 
4.  Do not make general claims about disabilities effects on the population 
Ex.: “Children with autism don't get pleasure from connection and thus lose 
their motivation to communicate” (Le Coz). 
Area of Concern: “Children with autism” 
Cultural implication: All people with autism experience the world the same 
way, emphasizing the distinction between people with autism and/or 
disabilities, and people without. 
QUOTES 
1.  Do not use a quote emphasizing the individual’s marginalization 
Ex.: “His own mother often wondered, ‘Is he even in there’” (Le Coz)? 
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Cultural implication: Even his mother did not view Watson as a 
communicable, connectable individual, dramatizing Watson’s 
marginalization. 
 
2.  Do not use a quote that evokes a reader’s sympathy and/or pity 
Ex.: “‘I'm not asking for free admission to the park or everybody stop the 
world for him to get on,’ said Marcy Mullins, a Harrison, Ohio, mom of an 11-
year-old autistic boy. ‘I would like to just see him happy, and if he can ride a 
ride a few times, it would mean the world to me’” (Richardson). 
Cultural implication: We should exempt this boy from societal rules because 
he is so rarely happy. The mother’s plea increases the effect of this claim, as 
the reader should feel sorry for both Mullins, who just wants her child to be 
happy, and the boy, whose autism has rendered him unhappy. The boy 
becomes further marginalized because the reader feels sorry for him, and 
places him in a space outside of cultural norms, exempt from societal rules. 
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